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MEASURING MINDFUL INTEROCEPTION:  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINDFUL INTEROCEPTION SAMPLING TASK (MIST) 
Samuel J. Dreeben 
June 18, 2014 
Sustained, non-evaluative, present moment interoception or ―mindful interoception‖ (MI) 
is a central feature of many widely practiced clinical interventions, including 
mindfulness-based therapies, cognitive-behavioral therapies, focusing-oriented 
psychotherapy, and Gestalt therapy. However, to date, no valid measures of MI have 
been developed. The lack of such a measure has precluded attempts to discern A) to what 
extent MI ability changes as a function of MI-based therapies, B) if change in MI 
mediates symptom reduction, and C) if individual differences in MI ability are associated 
with anxiety, mindfulness, and other hypothetically related constructs.  
The purpose of the current study was to develop and validate the first such 
measure of MI, the Mindful Interoception Sampling Task (MIST). The MIST is a 
behavioral measure of MI, in which participants focus attention on sequential regions of 
the body and are periodically prompted to report whether their attention has wandered. 





One hundred eight participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
courses for this study. Participants were administered the MIST and the Schandry 
heartbeat detection task, a widely used behavioral measure of interoception. A battery of 
questionnaires was also administered, and resting heart rate and blood pressure were 
recorded.  
Results of this study indicate the MIST is a valid behavioral measure of 
mindfulness, the first of its kind. Further research is still needed to determine whether the 
MIST specifically measures MI. Current findings, however, do suggest the newly 
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In both historical and contemporary mindfulness practice, interoception has been 
widely theorized to be a centrally important mechanism of clinical change. However, 
studies exploring the relationship between mindfulness and interoception have repeatedly 
obtained null results (Khalsa et al., 2008; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006; Parkin et al., 2013). 
 One possible explanation for these results is that researchers have mistakenly 
conflated distinct variants of interoception. In this chapter, I will review operational 
definitions, theories, and research on both mindfulness and interoception. I will then 
propose a new construct, mindful interoception (MI), which is based on the specific 
variant of interoception taught in clinical practice. I will then review the existing 
measures of mindfulness and interoception, and explore why these measures, in particular 
the traditional measures of interoception, likely do not measure MI. Finally, I will 
propose a new behavioral measure of MI, the Mindful Interoception Sampling Task 
(MIST), identify the needs for such a measure, and explore strategies for its development 
and validation. 
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness, a form of awareness originating in Buddhist psychology, has been 
increasingly widely incorporated into Western clinical practice. Clinicians now regularly 




benefit the clients‘ mental and physical health. Popularized by clinical interventions such 
as Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al., 2006), Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(Teasdale et al., 2000), and Dialectical Behavior Therapy (Linehan, Heard, & Armstrong, 
1993), mindfulness-based interventions have now been developed for a breadth of 
clinical issues, including generalized anxiety (Roemer, Orsillo, & Salters-Pedneault, 
2008), depression relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000), chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Kabat-
Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 1985), borderline personality disorder (Linehan, Heard, & 
Armstrong, 1993), alcohol and substance use disorders (Witkiewitz, Marlatt, & Walker, 
2005), eating disorders (Kristeller, Baer, & Quillian-Wolever, 2006), relationship 
counseling (Carson et al., 2004), and pre-military deployment training (Jha, Stanley, 
Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010). 
Drawing upon Lazarus and Folkman‘s (1984) transactional model of stress and 
coping, Salmon, Sephton, and Dreeben (2010) have proposed a model in which 
mindfulness influences cognitive appraisals, coping, event outcomes, emotional 
outcomes, physiological outcomes, health behavior, and health outcomes. A meta-
analysis of 39 studies of mindfulness-based therapies found a ―moderately effective‖ 
effect size for improving anxiety and mood symptoms pre- to post-intervention, with 
larger effect sizes for participants with pre-existing anxiety and mood disorders 
(Hofmann et al., 2010). Studies have also found that mindfulness practice is associated 
with increased cortisol rhythmicity (Matousek, Dobkin, & Pruessner, 2010), increased 
telomerase activity (Jacobs et al., 2010), improved immune functioning (Carlson et al., 
2007), and decreased systolic blood pressure (Carlson et al., 2007). These findings 
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suggest that mindfulness practice may contribute to mitigating the impact of processes 
such as aging and stress on physical health. Mindfulness practice additionally correlates 
with performance on attention tasks, including improved sustained attention to 
unexpected stimuli (Valentine & Sweet, 1999), reduced attentional blink effect (Slagter et 
al., 2007), and improved orienting abilities (Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007).  
Operational definitions. Despite the wellspring of research and support for 
mindfulness and mindfulness-based interventions in recent years, there remains 
considerable variability in how mindfulness is operationally defined. A widely cited 
definition of mindfulness comes from Jon Kabat-Zinn (2003), founder of the 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction program, who defined mindfulness as ―the 
awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and 
nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment‖ (p. 145). Kabat-
Zinn (2003) also states that all mindfulness practice shares a common outcome: the 
reduction of suffering. 
Carmody‘s (2009) definition of mindfulness begins with the observation that 
Buddhist practices are historically based on cultivating a clear perception of the 
experiences that create a sense of personal self. Sati, a form of concentration, is a central 
part of these Buddhist practices and has been translated from Pali into English as 
―mindfulness.‖ Carmody thus writes that mindfulness is a ―state of sustained attention to 
these ongoing mental contents and processes without thinking about, comparing, or in 
other ways evaluating them‖ (p. 271). Carmody further notes that there exist differences 
in how various Buddhist traditions define Sati, just as there are differences between how 
Western practitioners define mindfulness. 
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The most far-reaching attempt to operationalize mindfulness has come from a 
consortium of researchers who collaboratively proposed a ―two-component model‖ of 
mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004). The two components are: 1) self-regulated attention on 
―immediate experience‖, allowing for increased awareness of ―mental events‖ and 2) 
bringing ―curiosity, openness, and acceptance‖ to present-moment experiences. Echoing 
Kabat-Zinn‘s (2003) assertion that mindfulness reduces suffering, Bishop et al. note that 
mindfulness is used to improve awareness of mental processes that contribute to distress 
with the intention to end suffering. 
Also building on Kabat-Zinn‘s (2003) definition, Shapiro et al. (2006) posit three 
components of mindfulness: intention (―on purpose‖), attention (―paying attention‖), and 
attitude (―in a particular way‖). The authors note that the Japanese word for mindfulness 
includes the characters for mind and heart, suggesting that one translation of mindfulness 
could be ―heart-mindfulness‖. In this way, attitude and attention can be described as 
having an accepting, open, and kind quality in mindfulness.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the facets of mindfulness discussed in these 
operational definitions. Sustained attention, acceptance/non-evaluation, and present 
moment attention to immediate experience are commonly cited across definitions. 
Mechanisms of change. Researchers have also sought to understand mindfulness 
in terms of mechanisms of clinical change. There is even less agreement about 
mechanisms of mindfulness than the aforementioned operational definitions of 
mindfulness; however, certain mechanisms are commonly cited across theories. As Table 
2 illustrates, frequently cited mechanisms of clinical change include reperceiving, self-
regulation, acceptance/non-attachment, and exposure. 
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The first of these mechanisms, reperceiving (Shapiro et al., 2006) is described 
using different terminology in every paper: cognitive change (Baer, 2003), insight 
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007), change in perspective on self (Holzel et al., 2011b), 
and defusion and the observer self (Fletcher, Schoendorff, & Hayes, 2010). While the 
descriptions of these mechanisms vary slightly, they all refer to an objective observation 
of one‘s own thoughts and feelings as ―just thoughts‖ and ―just feelings,‖ thereby 
reducing evaluations and cyclical reactivity to experience. Self-regulation (Baer, 2003; 
Holzel et al., 2011b; Shapiro et al., 2006) describes the process of observing one‘s own 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors, and subsequently choosing informed, intentional ways 
of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Acceptance/non-attachment (Baer, 2003; Brown, et 
al., 2007; Fletcher, et al., 2010) describes a non-evaluative, non-reactive perspective on 
experience that allows the experience to be as it is rather than changing it. Exposure 
(Baer, 2003; Brown, et al., 2007; Shapiro et al., 2006) refers to sustaining attention on a 
distressing stimulus, eventually resulting in fear reduction. In describing exposure in 
mindfulness practice, Shapiro et al. (2006) write: ―Through this direct exposure, one 
learns that his or her emotions, thoughts, or body sensations are not so overwhelming or 
frightening. Through mindfully attending to negative emotional states, one learns 
experientially and phenomenologically that such emotions need not be feared or avoided 
and that they eventually pass away‖ (p. 381).    
Mindfulness defined. Based on the definitions of mindfulness provided above, I 
will define mindfulness as sustained, non-evaluative present moment attention. There are 
certainly drawbacks to this definition, namely that it excludes various nuances articulated 
in the aforementioned definitions. More broadly, there is also some concern in the field 
that mindfulness may never be satisfactorily defined in all its complexity. Grossman 
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(2008, 2011) notes that the term ―mindfulness‖ has been taken out of its cultural context, 
and has therefore lost much of its meaning. He also suggests that a definition cannot 
accurately convey the experiential element of mindfulness. Grossman finally observes 
that the present discrepancies that exist between definitions and measures of mindfulness 
are reason enough to be reluctant to use the term. 
As such, Grossman (2008, 2011) would likely discourage the use of the term 
―mindfulness,‖ especially if the definition is derived from analysis of Western definitions 
of the word. While I am sympathetic to his perspective, I also contend that Western 
clinical science lacks a useful word to describe sustained, non-evaluative present moment 
attention. It may not perfectly align with the meaning of Sati in the original Pali, but even 
then, there is much disagreement among Buddhists across the world as to what Sati 
means (Carmody, 2009). That the term ―mindfulness‖ has provided clinicians and 
researchers a pragmatic means to both think about and incorporate sustained non-
evaluative present moment attention into clinical practice gives it enough utility to merit 
continuing its use. Accordingly, I will use ―mindfulness‖ as a concise form of ―sustained, 
non-evaluative present moment attention.‖ 
Interoception 
Operational definitions. Interoception is a construct that refers broadly to the 
perception of internal sensation or ―perceiving within‖ (Siegel, 2010). However, like 
mindfulness, there is some disagreement as to how interoception should be defined. 
Historically, interoception has largely been measured as perception of viscera or internal 
organs (e.g. heart, intestines, lungs). It can be difficult, however, to differentiate 
sensations that occur entirely internally from sensations that occur concurrently on the 
surface of the body. For instance, heartbeats could be perceived as pressure against the 
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rib cage and skin, or as muscular contractions of the heart. In a case study, Khalsa et al. 
(2009) examined a man with complete bilateral insula and anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) damage, but an intact primary somatosensory cortex. As such, he was unable to 
perceive internal sensations, but could still perceive the sensation of touch. The 
researchers gave the participant increasing doses of isoproterenol to increase his heart 
rate and had him rate the intensity of his heart rate. In this condition, he demonstrated 
delayed but accurate reporting of heart rate intensity. The researchers next anaesthetized 
the skin around his chest and repeated the task. In this instance, he was unable to report 
an increase in heart rate. This suggests that traditional interoception measurements such 
as heartbeat detection still include elements of pressure and touch, even when the 
intention is solely to measure internal visceral sensation. 
Craig (2002) argues that based on these findings and others in functional 
neuroanatomy, interoception should be defined as ―the sense of the physiological 
condition of the entire body, not just the viscera‖ (p. 655). Using a similarly broad 
definition, Pollatos et al. (2007) write that interoception is simply ―the ability to perceive 
bodily changes‖ (p. 179). In a review of body awareness questionnaires, Mehling et al. 
(2009) define interoception as ―the processing of sensory input from inside the body in 
contrast to exteroception, the processing of input from outside the body (vision, hearing, 
smell, taste, and touch, with taste and touch having components of both)‖ [emphasis 
added] (p. 2). Cameron (2001) also defines interoception as ―afferent information that 
arises from anywhere and everywhere within the body – the skin and all that is 
underneath the skin, e.g. labyrinthine and proprioceptive functions – not just the visceral 
organs‖ (p. 697). Lastly, Domschke et al. (2010) define interoception as ―the 
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physiological condition of the body, i.e. conscious awareness, emotional processes and 
behavior related to afferent physiological information arising from the body‖ (p. 2).  
Taking into consideration the broad definitions of interoception commonly used 
today, interoception, interoceptive awareness, and interoceptive attention will be used 
interchangeably in this paper to covey awareness of endogenous physical sensations. 
Awareness of physical sensations will be defined to include sensations that occur 
internally or at the surface of the body. Although proprioception, the perception of the 
body in space, is necessary for identifying certain physical sensations, I will consider it a 
separate but complimentary form of perception.   
Interoception and emotion. The idea that physical sensations are central to the 
experience of emotion has a long history in Western psychology. In 1884, William James 
wrote that ―bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and 
that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion‖ (p. 190). In 1885, Carl 
Lange theorized that emotions were purely a cardiovascular event (Lang, 1994). In 1894, 
James shared credit for his theory of emotion with Lange in his essay ―The Physical 
Basis of Emotion.‖ The theory is now known as the James-Lange theory of emotion 
(Lang, 1994).  
To date, the James-Lange theory is still prominently debated in theory of emotion. 
Among the most prominent early critics of the James-Lange theory was Walter Cannon 
(1927), who argued that arousal is not sufficient to create emotions and that people 
without interoceptive abilities still experienced emotions. Peter Lang (1994) notes that 
Cannon‘s critique was more pointedly aimed at Carl Lange‘s theory of emotions, which 




In 1962, Schachter and Singer proposed a two-factor theory of emotion that 
prominently featured physical sensations as central to emotional experience. Schachter 
and Singer wrote: ―Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react 
emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a 
state of physiological arousal‖ (p. 382). They also contend ―the same state of 
physiological arousal could be labeled ‗joy‘ or ‗fury‘ or ‗jealousy‘ or any of a great 
diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation‖ (pp. 
381-382).  
Schachter and Singer (1962) found support for this theory by administering 
epinephrine to participants, and then manipulating whether the participants expected the 
subsequent physiological arousal, and whether a confederate interacted with them in a 
euphoric or angry manner. In conditions where the participants did not expect the 
physiological arousal, they were more likely to describe their emotional state as euphoric 
or angry depending on the presentation of the confederate. In conditions where the 
participants did expect the arousal, they were more likely to attribute the physiological 
response to the epinephrine.  
To better ascertain the relative importance of interoception in emotional 
experience, researchers have studied the emotional experience of individuals with 
interoceptive deficiencies, such as persons with spinal transections or pure autonomic 
failure (Wiens, 2005). While some researchers have pointed to examples of emotional 
diminution in quadriplegics (Damasio, 1994) and persons with pure autonomic failure 
(Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002), other studies have found little evidence of 




Today most theories of emotion agree that emotional states can be generated and 
maintained by appraisals of both cognitive and physiological phenomena (Beck, Emery, 
& Greenberg, 1985; Lang, 1994; Lazarus, 1982), which would explain why individuals 
with interoceptive deficiencies in some instances still report experiences of emotions. 
Physical sensations remain, however, a relevant object of evaluation within the 
phenomenal field and may be implicated in the majority of emotional states. 
Interoception, emotion, and the brain. In the last 20 years, neuroimaging 
studies have provided compelling evidence for the centrality of interoception to the 
experience of emotion.  
The insular cortex, particularly the anterior insular cortex, has been identified as 
the neural structure most closely related to awareness of internal visceral sensations 
(Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2002). Craig (2002) writes that that the anterior insular cortex is 
the location of the ―subjective evaluation‖ of how you emotionally feel. Craig (2002) also 
notes that the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortices (ACC) (in addition to 
subcortical regions such as the amygdala and ventral striatum) are activated together in 
―virtually all imaging studies of emotion‖ (p. 663).  
Studies suggest that the ACC is central to motivation (Craig, 2002; Paulus and 
Stein, 2006); for instance, Bechara and Naqvi (2004) note that lesions to the ACC result 
in apathy. Lesions of the anterior insular cortex also produce anergia (Craig, 2009). 
Paulus and Stein (2006) have theorized that the bidirectional connections between the 
ACC and the insula link interoception with cognitive and affective processes.  
A study of individuals with either amygdala or insula lesions provides further 
support for the centrality of the insula in affect (Berntson et al., 2011). In response to 
pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), individuals with 
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amygdala lesions only demonstrated reduced arousal for negatively valenced pictures and 
no deficit in ratings of arousal for negative or positive pictures compared to a control 
group. Individuals with insula lesions, however, demonstrated reduced arousal for 
positive and negative emotions, as well as reduced arousal ratings compared to the 
control group. 
The anterior insular cortex has also been implicated in the broader feeling ―I am,‖ 
the basis of human awareness (Craig, 2009). Damasio (2003) observes that the body is 
the brain‘s only continually processed foci of attention and therefore perception of the 
body can be hypothesized as the basis for a continued sense of self over time. 
Damasio‘s (1996) Somatic Marker Hypothesis also states that the interoceptive 
facet of emotional states is critical to decision making. In Descartes’ Error (1994), he 
observes that anosognosic patients with damage to the insula and areas of the parietal 
lobe demonstrate absence of emotional responding, inability to acknowledge physical 
maladies, and deficits in decision-making (pp. 63-70). Damasio hypothesizes that without 
monitoring of bodily states, people are unable to gauge the extent to which a situation 
poses potential for risk or reward. The insula has been now confirmed in subsequent 
studies of preference judgments to be implicated in these processes (Clark et al., 2008; 
Kirk, Downar, & Read Montague, 2011; Paulus & Frank, 2003). Interoception is thus 
theorized to play a central role in emotions, and higher-order emotion-based processes, 
such as decision-making and sense of self. 
Mindful Interoception 
Operational definition. Having defined mindfulness as ―sustained, non-
evaluative present moment attention‖ and interoception as ―awareness of endogenous 
physical sensations occurring internally or at the surface of the body,‖ I propose that MI 
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be defined as ―sustained, non-evaluative present moment attention to endogenous 
physical sensations occurring internally or at the surface of the body.‖ 
Mindful interoception and historical Buddhism. MI, as such defined, has a 
long history in mindfulness practices, as well as Western clinical practices. Historically, 
Buddhism‘s Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta defines mindfulness of the body as the gateway to 
mindfulness practice (Holzel et al., 2011b; Olendzki, 2010). Mindfulness of body is the 
first of four foundations of mindfulness; the others are mindfulness of feelings, 
mindfulness of consciousness, and mindfulness of mental objects (Kuan, 2008; Olendzki, 
2010).  
According to Buddhist scholar Andrew Olendzki (2010), the first foundation of 
mindfulness can be described as ―systematic training in attending to the senses‖ (p. 89). 
Mindfulness of the body is summarized in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta as follows: ―If a monk 
or a nun thus contemplates the body as a body little by little, this is called ‗the 
establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body‘‖ (Kuan, 2008, p. 
151). Olendzki (2010) writes that:  
―The reason this is effective is that the mind can be aware of only one 
thing at a time… At first, there may be far more mind-moments of mental 
cognition than of sense cognition in the stream of consciousness, but over time, as 
the practice of mindfulness of the body develops, one can actually have multiple 
consecutive moments of sense awareness uninterrupted by ‗thinking about‘ what 
one is sensing. To those who habitually think too much, this is experienced as 
blissful relief‖ (p. 89) 
 
In Buddhist psychology, bodily sensations are more central to the experience of 
emotions than cognitions (Drummond, 2006) and are considered the conduit for 
attachment, aversion, and ignorance (Holzel et al., 2011b, Olendzki, 2010). From a 
Buddhist perspective, then, mindfulness of body frees the mind from becoming attached 
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to or averse to emotions, thereby stopping the perpetual cycle of emotional reactivity and 
suffering. 
MI in modern clinical practice. No Western mindfulness-based intervention so 
clearly incorporates MI into the curriculum as Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction 
(MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Not surprisingly, Kabat-Zinn (2003) has cited the 
Satipathana Sutta as a foundation for his understanding of mindfulness practice.  
The first practice in the MBSR program, the body scan, is a 45-minute guided 
attention task directing non-evaluative attention sequentially through regions of the body 
without moving the body (Dreeben, Mamberg, & Salmon, 2013). The second practice, 
MBSR Hatha Yoga, directs non-evaluative attention to guided physical movements 
(Salmon et al, 2009). The third practice, mindfulness meditation, directs attention to the 
sensations of the breath. This form of meditation is also commonly practiced in many 
non-clinical settings. 
Other mindfulness-based interventions, such as Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy, have incorporated mindfulness meditation, the body scan, and mindful 
movement into treatment approaches (Williams et al., 2006). Mindfulness-Based Relapse 
Preventions (MBRP) for addictive behaviors has similarly developed the concept of the 
―SOBER breathing space,‖ which includes mindful attention to internal sensations 
(Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010). In the acronym SOBER from MBRP, ―S‖ stands for 
―Stop‖; ―O‖ stands for ―Observe the sensations that are happening in your body‖; ―B‖ 
stands for ―Breath‖; ―E‖ stands for ―Expand your awareness to include the rest of your 
body, your experience, and to the situation‖; and ―R‖ stands for ―Respond mindfully‖ 
(Bowen, Chawla, & Marlatt, 2010, p. 90). 
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In Dialectical Behavior Therapy (Linehan, 1993), clients are taught seven ―core‖ 
skills: wise mind, observe, describe, participate, nonjudgmentally, one-mindfully, and 
effectively (Rizvi, Welch, & Dimidjian, 2009). Although each core skill has potential 
relevance to MI-based practice, ―observe‖ is the most closely related. This core skill 
encourages clients to observe their sensory experiences without judgmental evaluation 
(Rizvi et al., 2009). Although this can also include sensory experiences such as sight and 
smell, the act of observing physical sensations non-judgmentally is included within the 
training. This skill is taught as a means of discovering that ―emotion itself is not 
threatening‖ (Rizvi et al., 2009, p. 249).  
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy primarily uses metaphors, setting values, 
and language deconstruction as clinical tools; however, it also can include mindful 
attention to physical sensations such as breathing, muscle tension, pain, and craving 
(Orsillo et al., 2004; Robinson, Wicksell, & Olsson, 2004; Wilson & Byrd, 2004). 
Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy (Gendlin, 1996), although not explicitly a mindfulness-
based therapy, incorporates a variant of MI as the core feature of the therapy. Gendlin 
developed the practice of ―Focusing‖ to bring client‘s sustained attention to distressing 
somatic sensations. Referring to the ―felt sense‖ of an emotion, he would instruct clients 
to give a ―handle‖ to an emotion by labeling it (Gendlin, 1996). Clients were then 
instructed to continue exploring the ―felt sense‖ and to identify new ―handles‖ as new 
facets of the experience came to light. Therapeutically, Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy 
provided a means for altering reactivity and avoidance to the somatic element of 
emotional experience. Gestalt Therapy also holds avoidance of painful feelings as a 




―…the Gestalt technique demands… that [the patient] experience himself 
as fully as he can in the here and now. We ask the patient to become aware of his 
gestures, of his breathing, of his emotions, of his voice, and of his facial 
expressions as much as of his pressing thoughts… As he experiences the ways in 
which he prevents himself from ―being‖ now… he will also begin to experience 
the self he has interrupted‖ (pp. 63-64). 
 
In cognitive behavioral therapy, avoidance of affect (i.e. sensations, feelings, and 
thoughts) has been theorized as a maintaining factor for anxiety (Butler, Fennell, & 
Hackman, 2008). According to Butler et al., avoidance of affect occurs across all anxiety 
disorders. As such, a number of cognitive behavioral treatments for anxiety disorders 
involve non-evaluative attention to physical sensations as part of the protocol. For 
instance, panic disorder is conceptualized as being maintained by misevaluations of 
internal sensations (Craske & Barlow, 2008). As such, interoceptive exposure for 
individuals with panic disorder involves attending to intentionally elicited distressing 
interoceptive cues in an otherwise safe environment to extinguish fear responses (Craske 
& Barlow, 2008). Butler et al. (2008) note that hypochondriasis is also maintained by 
catastrophic evaluations of internal sensations, only the distress is about what will happen 
in the future rather than in the present. Phobias have also been conceptualized as attention 
to both the phobic stimuli and the physical sensations of anxiety, creating a ―fear of fear‖ 
(Butler et al., 2008, p. 15). Although cognitive behavioral therapists hold that cognitions 
can also be objects of appraisal, evaluation of sensations remains a central maintaining 
factor of distress. In a therapy case example, Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) have 
the sample therapist speak the following to an anxious client:  
―There is literally nothing else that you can be aware of but feelings and 
sensations. Anything that you experience in life is composed of feelings and 
sensations. If you‘re afraid of making a fool of yourself when giving a speech, 
what you‘re really afraid of are your sensations of anxiety, self-consciousness, 




Across many theoretical orientations and therapeutic modalities, MI is a widely 
used mechanism of change for anxiety and other psychological disorders.  
Potential mechanisms of change. The aforementioned treatments share the 
common precept that attending to physical sensations with an attitude of non-judgment 
can mitigate reactivity to negative emotional states. Kabat-Zinn (1982) has hypothesized 
that non-judgmental exposure to physical sensations might reduce experiences of anxiety 
and chronic pain. Similarly, Linehan has described individuals with borderline 
personality disorder as emotion phobic (Baer, 2003; Linehan, 1993), and hypothesized 
that exposure to thoughts and feelings via non-judgmental attention might promote 
habituation and reduced emotional reactivity (Linehan, 1993). Hayes and colleagues 
theorized that avoidance of physical sensations, thoughts, and situations is a 
transdiagnostic maintaining factor of all psychopathology (Hayes et al., 1996). Hayes 
therefore proposes acceptance as a means of exposing people to their experiences in a 
safe way. Fletcher et al. (2010) also discuss the possibility that for anxious people, 
mindfulness practice could equate to a type of gradual exposure to anxiety-triggering 
somatic sensations, thereby increasing habituation and reducing avoidance. 
Avoidance and sustained attention have been theorized as a maintaining factor 
and mechanisms of clinical change, respectively, across a variety of theoretical 
orientations. In a meta-analysis of 43 studies, Suls and Fletcher (1985) examined the 
comparative efficacy of avoidance strategies and attention strategies in terms of pain, 
stress, and anxiety reduction. They found that attention to ―sensory schemata‖ resulted in 
better outcomes than avoidance. However, if the attention involved interpretation (what 
mindfulness practitioners might call evaluation or judgment), then the reverse was true. 
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Overall, attention of any sort resulted in better long-term outcomes, while avoidance 
resulted in less distress in the short-term. 
Borkovec and colleagues have identified anxious worry as a means of diverting 
attention from internal sensations and reducing distress in the short-term (Borkovec, 
Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991). Borkovec (1994) writes: ―Perhaps the most exciting and 
important discovery about worry is that it is negatively reinforced by its suppressing 
effects on autonomic activity and by this function results in a prevention of emotional 
processing‖ (p. 18). Borkovec, Ray, and Stober (1998) also note: ―If worry as an 
avoidance response does immediately suppress somatic/affective aspects of anxious 
experience, it may thereby be negatively reinforced‖ (p. 564). Studies supporting these 
assertions include a study in which worrisome thinking prior to a public speech reduced 
cardiovascular reactivity compared to relaxation or neutral thought conditions (Borkovec 
& Hu, 1990); however, the worrisome thinking condition showed no signs of fear 
extinction. Another study demonstrated that people spontaneously use verbalization as a 
means of avoiding emotional events, thereby decreasing sympathetic arousal (Tucker & 
Newman, 1981). These converging studies provide support for the premise that 
distraction and worry are commonly used to avoid distressing internal sensations in the 
short term, while reducing extinction of fear responses in the long term.   
Foa and Kozak (1986) note that fear extinction is unlikely to occur unless the 
sensations of fear are felt during the confrontation. They further report that experiencing 
reduced arousal after prolonged exposure to a feared stimulus reduces the extent to which 
the stimulus is evaluated as threatening. Paradoxically then, interoceptive attention is 
both a symptom of anxiety and a treatment for anxiety in Western practice. More 
specifically hypervigilant interoception alternating with mental distraction is 
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symptomatic of anxiety while mindful interoception is the shared mechanism that 
treatments such as mindfulness-based interventions, exposure therapy, Focusing-Oriented 
psychotherapy, and Gestalt Therapy use to reduce emotional reactivity.  
Measuring Mindful Interoception 
Measures of both mindfulness and interoception have been developed over the 
years, but to date there remain no measures of MI. In this section I will review measures 
of both mindfulness and interoception. 
Self-report mindfulness measures. A number of self-report measures have been 
developed to assess trait and state mindfulness. A list of the most commonly used 
mindfulness questionnaires would include the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS) (Brown et al., 2007), the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) (Baer 
et al., 2006), and the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS) (Lau et al., 2006). The MAAS is 
a 15-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the degree to which people attend to 
everyday tasks. The TMS is a 13-item self-report measure with two subscales, ―curiosity‖ 
and ―decentering,‖ assessing ―what you just experienced, just now.‖ The FFMQ is a 39-
item five-factor scale developed from a factor analysis of five earlier mindfulness scales. 
The five subscales of the FFMQ are observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-
judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. 
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS) (Cardaciotto et al., 2008) has been 
less widely used, but contains questions that directly assess MI. The PHLMS is a 20-item 
self-report questionnaire with two subscales, ―acceptance‖ and ―awareness.‖  
Although MI is a central feature of both historical Buddhism and modern-day 
mindfulness-based practices, the aforementioned scales largely fail to assess it. Of these 
scales, only the FFMQ and PHLMS have prompts that directly relate to interoception; 
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however, neither measure has a distinct subscale for MI. The subscales that most closely 
relate to interoception are the awareness subscale of the PHLMS and the observing 
subscale of the FFMQ.  
Examining the ten prompts on the ―awareness‖ subscale of the PHLMS, two or 
three clearly relate to interoception (e.g. ―When I am startled, I notice what is going on 
inside my body‖), three or four more are indirectly related (―When talking with other 
people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing‖), and two or three are not related 
(e.g. ―I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind.‖). The observing scale 
of the FFMQ more specifically assesses awareness of sensations, with a few questions 
partially assessing interoception (e.g. ―I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, 
bodily sensations, and emotions‖) and other questions assessing non-interoceptive 
sensations (e.g. ―I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars 
passing‖).  
Both the awareness subscale of the PHLMS and the observing subscale of the 
FFMQ phrase certain questions in a way that both a mindful person and an anxious 
person might endorse. For instance, ―I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, 
bodily sensations, and emotions‖ could be endorsed both by a hypervigilant, 
hypochondriacal person and a person trained in mindfulness practice, although the 
interpretations would vary. In support of this hypothesis, the observing subscale of the 
FFMQ has the poorest correlation with the other four subscales (and a non-significant 
correlation with the nonjudging of inner experience scale) except when limited to 
participants with meditation experience, in which case it is significantly correlated with 
all four scales (Baer et al., 2006). As such, it seems likely that participants without 
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experience in mindfulness practice are interpreting observing prompts differently than 
participants with experience in mindfulness practice. 
Carmody and Baer (2008) have also examined FFMQ subscales in relationship to 
MBSR practice, including MI-based practices. They found that the observing subscale 
does increase significantly from pre-MBSR to post-MBSR. They also found that the 
observing subscale was significantly correlated with body scan practice time, yoga 
practice time, and total formal practice time, but not sitting meditation or total informal 
practice time. This is consistent with the aforementioned results suggesting that the 
observing scale successfully measures mindfulness of sensations in the specific context 
of mindfulness interventions or mindfulness practice. 
In addition to debating whether ―mindfulness‖ can be operationally defined, 
Grossman (2008, 2011) has also extensively questioned the use of self-report measures in 
mindfulness research. Grossman observes that there are differences in how people 
interpret questions on measures and that mindfulness practitioners likely overrate their 
own mindfulness. For instance, he describes the strong social desirability effect and 
cognitive dissonance present when mindfulness practitioners rate their own levels of 
mindfulness. Grossman also questions whether people can accurately report their own 
attentional abilities. Finally, Grossman claims that mindfulness questionnaires lack 
external criteria to validate the measures, as there is no consensus as to the definition of 
mindfulness or what mindful behavior is. 
As such mindfulness measures may currently lack content validity on a general 
level, while also failing to assess MI more specifically. Next I will discuss self-report 
measures of body awareness that may also be relevant to measuring MI. 
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Self-report body awareness measures. There are a number of self-report 
measures that have been developed to assess aspects of somatic attention. In a review of 
body awareness questionnaires, Mehling et al. (2009) identified 12 measures that 
specifically measure body awareness. These self-report measures included the Body 
Intelligence Scale, a scale that is informed by transpersonal psychology and focuses on 
―energy‖ in the body (Anderson, 2006); the Body Responsiveness Questionnaire, a scale 
developed for yoga practitioners (Daubenmeier, 2005); the Timer Questionnaire, a scale 
to assess gender differences in body awareness (Franzoi, 1989); the Scale of Body 
Awareness, a scale to assess body awareness and medical care use by older adults 
(Hansell, Sherman, & Mechanic, 1991); the Body Vigilance Scale, a scale to assess body 
awareness in panic disorder, (Schmidt, Lerew, & Trakowski, 1997); and the Health 
Consciousness Subscale of the Multidimensional Health Questionnaire, a scale for 
measuring the extent to which people think about their health,(Snell & Johnson, 1996). 
In the scales reviewed, only the Private Body Consciousness Subscale (PBCS) of 
the Body Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller, Murphy, & Buss 1981) and the Body 
Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ) (Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989) had more than four 
published studies in which the measure was used. Additionally, only the PBCS and BAQ 
demonstrated a high standard for reliability, as assessed by the authors. Four scales--the 
BAQ, the PBCS, the Body Vigilance Scale (BVS), and the Scale of Body Connection 
(SBC) (Price & Thompson, 2007)--met a high standard for validity as assessed by the 
authors.  
Examining these measures more closely, eight of the eighteen items on the BAQ 
assess the ability to predict future bodily states, in direct contrast to the construct of MI in 
which attention is oriented to the present moment. Interestingly, the BAQ also does not 
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assess awareness of sensations in the context of emotional states. The PBCS subscale of 
the BCQ consists of only 5 questions, each of which assesses awareness of negative 
physical sensations. The BVS similarly focuses on awareness of negative physical 
sensations, eliciting ratings for 15 forms of physical discomfort. The language of these 
measures consistently includes evaluations of sensations, and is thus incompatible with 
MI. Not surprisingly, the BAQ and BVS are both positively correlated with 
hypochondriac tendency (Ginzburg et al., 2013). Studies have consistently shown that 
individuals who tend to experience sensations as strong and negatively valenced also 
have the least ability to accurately discern subtle sensations (Bogaerts et al., 2008; 
Mailloux & Brener, 2002; Steptoe & Noll, 1997), suggesting that high scorers on the 
aforementioned self-report measures may have difficulty with in vivo interoception. 
However, there remains no research to date on the relationship or lack thereof between 
these self-report measures of body awareness, and other measures of interoception (e.g. 
heartbeat detection, fMRI studies). 
At least one study (Sze et al., 2010) has examined the BAQ and PBCS in the 
context of mindfulness meditators. The scales, however, were combined into one scale of 
―visceral awareness,‖ and the only reported outcome was that mindfulness meditators 
reported significantly higher ―visceral awareness‖ than experienced dancers or controls. 
As such, there is still no clear association between trait mindfulness or mindfulness 
practice with these body awareness self-report measures.  
Although it has been used sparingly in research to date, the Scale of Body 
Connection (SBC) is the one scale reviewed by Mehling et al. (2009) that most closely 
approximates MI. Items include awareness of both positive and negative physical 
experiences, and the measure differentiates between avoidant ―Body Dissociation‖ and 
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more mindful ―Body Awareness‖ in its two subscales. However, it is unclear whether the 
self-report format provides accurate retrospective accounts of mindful interoception. 
Additionally, the prompts do not explicitly assess non-evaluative attention to physical 
sensations. For instance, a mindful person and a hypochondriacal person would likely 
interpret the prompt ―Notice where tension is in my body‖ quite differently. The 
emphasis on global/static traits is also inconsistent with mindful attention to present 
moment, dimensional, active experience. 
To date, the SBC has been used in a study of Mindful Awareness Body-Oriented 
Therapy for women with a substance abuse disorder (Price et al., 2011), for body-
oriented therapy for adult victims of childhood sexual abuse (Price, 2005), and for body-
oriented group psychotherapy for treating trauma (Langmuir, Kirsh, & Classen, 2012). 
The latter two studies found improvements across time in both the body awareness and 
body dissociation subscales, while the substance abuse study found improvements only in 
the bodily dissociation subscale. 
Mehling et al. (2009) raised concerns about the instruments reviewed, for 
example that they often overlook the ―quality or mode‖ of attention. Concerning the 
quality of mindfulness they write, ―Currently, validated measures for body awareness are 
not able to discern between (a) anxiety-related hypervigilance toward pain and other 
physical sensations with catastrophizing interpretation bias and (b) a non-judgmental, 
meditative, ‗mindful‘ awareness of these sensations‖ (p. 12). They also note that most 
authors treat ―body awareness‖ as a unitary construct yet the measures reviewed clearly 
assess varying constructs. 
In response to these perceived gaps in the literature, Mehling, Price (developer of 
the SBC), and colleagues have collaboratively developed the Multidimensional 
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Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA), a self-report scale of various 
dimensions of interoceptive attention (Mehling et al., 2012). The MAIA is a 32-item self-
report measure assessing eight scales of interoceptive awareness: Noticing, Distracting, 
Not-Worrying, Attention Regulation, Emotional Awareness, Self-Regulation, Body 
Listening, and Trusting. The MAIA assesses awareness of negative, positive, and neutral 
sensations; awareness of the entire body; and avoidance and acceptance of sensations in 
the context of emotional states. Although each scale is conceptually related to MI, the 7-
item Attention Regulation scale, the 3-item Body Listening scale, and the 3-item Not-
Worrying scale appear most closely related. The Attention Regulation scale includes 
items such as ―I can maintain awareness of my inner bodily sensations even when there is 
a lot going on around me‖ and ―I can refocus my attention from thinking to sensing my 
body.‖ The Body Listening scale includes the following prompt: ―I listen for information 
from my body about my emotional state.‖ The Not-Worrying scale includes the following 
prompt: ―I can notice an unpleasant body sensation without worrying about it.‖   
When asked why the word ―mindfulness‖ was not used to describe the MAIA or 
the scales of the MAIA, Mehling answered that his understanding of mindfulness is that 
it is ―awareness of anything, rather than of the body‖ (personal communication, March 
16
th
, 2012). Using the definition ―sustained non-evaluative present moment attention to 
physical sensations,‖ the MAIA would likely be considered a measure of MI. This point 
underscores the importance of operationally defining ―mindfulness‖ such that some 
consensus on the definition can be reached among clinicians and researchers. 
Detection tasks. 
Overview of detection tasks. Although interoception has been defined to include 
awareness of many different sensations including itch, tickle, sensual touch, ache, 
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vasomotor flush, hunger, thirst, and air hunger (Craig, 2008; Paulus & Stein, 2006), 
historically interoception has been measured using tasks that assess the accuracy of 
heartbeat detection. In this section, I will review the history of heartbeat detection tasks 
and their applicability for measuring MI.  
The two most commonly used heartbeat detection tasks are tone-based 
discrimination tasks and the Schandry heartbeat detection task (Domschke et al., 2010; 
Schandry, 1981). In tone-based heartbeat detection tasks, the participant is asked to 
determine whether several series of auditory beeps correspond with the participant‘s 
actual heart rate. For each trial, the tones are either matched to the person‘s heartbeat or 
on a delay. Participants are then measured on the accuracy with which they correctly 
identify matched tones and unmatched tones.  
In the Schandry heartbeat detection task, participants are asked to count their 
heartbeats over a few brief periods of time, each lasting under a minute, and are then 
assessed for accuracy (Schandry, 1981). Accuracy is then calculated as a percentage 
error.  
Critics of the Schandry heartbeat detection task have argued that it is more a 
measure of time estimation; however, Ehlers and Breuer (1992) found that participants 
performed worse on measures of time estimation than they did on the Schandry heartbeat 
detection task. Domschke et al. (2010) add that heartbeats are typically underreported, 
suggesting that participants are missing heartbeats rather than simply guessing.  
Critics of the tone-based discrimination tasks note that accuracy rates are 
consistently near chance (Domschke et al., 2010; Khalsa et al., 2008; Parkin et al., 2013). 
There is also some concern that the competition of cues between tones and heartbeats 
confounds measurement of interoception (Pennebaker, 1982). It is possible that the act of 
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counting during the Schandry heartbeat detection task also distracts attention from 
interoception. 
Across types of detection tasks, heartbeat perception has been found to be 
influenced by a number of variables including gender, blood pressure, body fat and 
fitness, resting heart rate heart rate, and stress (Domschke et al., 2010). Additionally, 
participants‘ self-reported performances frequently do not significantly correlate with 
actual performance and there are anecdotal reports of participants using guesswork 
during the tasks (Wiens, 2005). As such, it is still unclear exactly what heartbeat 
detection tasks measure, although there are consistent outcomes found within the research 
literature.  
Although heartbeat perception is by far the most common measure of 
interoception, a few other in vivo measures do exist. For instance, researchers have 
examined participants‘ sensitivity to incrementally increased resistance to airflow via 
tubes or mesh pieces fitted over the mouth (Dahme, Richter, & Mass, 1996). Dahme et al. 
have also measured sensitivity to bronchoconstriction as various levels of allergic agents 
were introduced. Khalsa et al. measured changes in perception of heartbeat as 
incremental doses of isoproterenol were administered (2009). ―Balloon distension of the 
sigmoid colon by a calibrated rectosigmoid probe” has also been used as a stimulus to 
measure interoceptive sensitivity in the gastrointestinal tract (Holzl et al. 1996, p. 202).  
Collectively, these alternative interoceptive measures are invasive, potentially 
dangerous, and complicated. Another major limitation is that they create artificial 
sensations, thus providing little information about interoception as it occurs naturally. As 
such, heartbeat detection tasks remain the gold standard for measuring interoception. 
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Mindfulness and detection tasks. Although interoceptive awareness is 
theoretically and clinically central to mindfulness, there remain no studies to date in 
which performance on detection tasks is associated with mindfulness measures or 
practice. In this section, I will review the research to date on heartbeat detection tasks and 
mindfulness. 
Nielsen and Kaszniak (2006) administered a tone-based heartbeat detection task 
to 11 long-term meditators (at least 10 years of meditation practice, practicing an average 
of 8.2 times per week) and 17 nonmeditating controls. They found no significant 
difference between meditators and non-meditators on the heartbeat detection task. 
Nielsen and Kaszniak also found that stronger heartbeat detection was positively 
associated with higher skin conductance responses to nonmasked unpleasant and neutral 
pictures in the International Affective Picture System, suggesting that negative emotional 
reactivity is related to heartbeat detection scores. 
Khalsa et al. (2008) ran a similar study, assessing whether there were significant 
differences in tone-based heartbeat detection between 17 nonmeditators and 30 
meditators (17 Kundalini, 13 Tibetan Buddhist, minimum of 15 years of formal practice). 
Although this study had greater power, included comparison subjects matched on age and 
body mass, and included a second, additional testing day, there were still no significant 
differences found between meditators and nonmeditators on the heartbeat detection task. 
They did, however, find that meditation experience was positively associated with 
increased confidence in heartbeat detection. 
Khalsa et al. (2008) suggest that awareness of heartbeats is not specifically 
cultivated in meditation practice, which could explain this null result. They also suggest 
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that the results may have been different had the participants detected heartbeats while 
moving.  
Parkin et al. (2013) ran a series of four studies with sample sizes ranging from 19 
participants to 165 participants. Across these studies, they found that performance on the 
Schandry heartbeat detection task was not associated with practicing a 15-minute body 
scan for one week, with participating in an 8-week MBSR or MBCT group, or with trait 
mindfulness as measured by the FFMQ. They did find, however, that confidence in 
heartbeat perception increased with participation in the 8-week groups and with higher 
trait mindfulness scores. 
Reflecting on the consistent null results found across the literature and the 
seemingly misplaced confidence of mindfulness practitioners, Parkin et al. (2013) suggest 
that mindfulness practice may actually impair interoceptive ability. They hypothesize that 
mindfulness practice may create mental representations of the body that are not consistent 
with actual bodily states. They also posit that people may be initially drawn to 
mindfulness practice because they are seeking ways to improve body awareness. 
In light of these findings and these many attempts to explain them, I will argue 
that there is a more parsimonious and likely explanation for why these researchers did not 
obtain their hypothesized results. 
Potential covariates. The most cited finding in the study of heartbeat perception 
tasks is a positive association with measures of anxiety (Domschke et al., 2010). As such, 
interoception research has long focused on the positive correlation between attention to 
somatic sensations and constructs such as anxiety, panic, hypochondriasis, and 
somatization (Cameron, 2001; Domschke et al., 2010). The experience of anxiety 
includes future-directed, evaluative thinking about potential threats. By this definition, 
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anxiety is in direct contrast to mindful, present-moment non-evaluative attention. Given 
that mindfulness and anxiety should not theoretically be positively associated, this 
suggests that heartbeat detection tasks may not be assessing MI. 
Domschke et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis of 29 heartbeat detection and 
anxiety studies. Domshcke et al. defined anxiety sensitivity as ―beliefs about 
dangerousness of anxiety symptoms and the resulting fear of these symptoms‖ (p. 5). In 
most studies they reviewed, Anxiety Sensitivity was measured using the Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3). Domschke et al. (2010) defined trait anxiety as ―a general 
stable tendency to respond with anxiety to perceived threats in the environment,‖ (p. 6) 
while defining State Anxiety as ―a transitory emotional state or condition of the human 
organism fluctuating over time and varying in intensity‖ (p. 6). For the studies reviewed, 
these constructs were most frequently measured by the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
Panic Disorder was also diagnostically assessed; studies that included people with panic 
attacks but did not diagnostically assess panic disorder were included in the category 
―People with Panic Attacks.‖ Domschke et al. (2010) reported the following mean effect 
sizes between heartbeat perception and the aforementioned subtypes of anxiety: Anxiety 
Sensitivity (N = 149) d = 0.61; Trait Anxiety (N = 202) d = 0.37; Panic Disorder (N = 
609) d = 0.52; Panic Disorder with Schandry heartbeat detection task (N = 460) d = 0.64; 
and People with Panic Attacks (N = 186) d = 0.37.  
It is worth nothing that Domschke et al. (2010) found that studies using heartbeat 
detection tasks other than the Schandry heartbeat detection task typically did not find 
differences between anxious participants and non-anxious participants. It is likely, 
however, that the consistently near chance performance of participants on tone-based 
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tasks greatly decreased the possibility of finding between-group differences (Domschke 
et al., 2010; Khalsa et al., 2008).  
In a meta-study of heartbeat detection tasks, Van der Does et al. (2000) analyzed 
data from seven studies with 709 participants across eight diagnostic categories. 
Although few participants demonstrated highly accurate heartbeat perception, persons 
with panic disorder and other anxiety disorders were more accurate than healthy controls, 
depressed patients, patients with heart palpitations, and patients with infrequent panic 
attacks. The most accurate perceivers had the highest anxiety sensitivity scores as well. 
Do detection tasks measure MI? According to Smallwood and Schooler (2006), 
mind wandering is less likely to occur during a demanding task, a novel task, or a time-
limited task. As such, avoidantly distracting attention from physical sensations may not 
be an option during a time-limited, high-pressure task such as heartbeat detection. It may 
be then that hypervigilant anxious people and mindful people are both capable of 
attending to internal sensations over short periods of time; avoidance and mental 
distraction may only occur given appropriate time and opportunity.  
Another potential explanation is that counting serves as a type of distraction for 
avoidant/anxious people, limiting direct sustained attention to the valence of internal 
sensation. Also, focusing on one specific physical sensation to the exclusion of other 
sensations could be a form of avoidance as well. As such, it remains unclear how mindful 
people would perform on a task of MI since heartbeat detection tasks do not appear to 
assess the construct. 
Brain imaging. Presently, neuroscience is the experimental area in which 
interoception and mindfulness have been most consistently linked. Fletcher et al. (2010) 
describe in particular how the insula and interoception have been important foci of 
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attention in mindfulness research, noting that the insular cortex is implicated in fear 
perception, motivation, error detection, emotional perception, and allocation of 
attentional resources. In The Mindful Brain Daniel Siegel (2007) writes that, ―The insula 
transmits data from the body to the brain… and may directly be involved in the 
experience of looking inward‖ (p. 103). 
Two neuroimaging studies have found positive associations between mindfulness 
meditation experience and gray matter concentration and thickness in the insula (Holzel 
et al., 2008; Lazar et al., 2005). Other neuroimaging studies have demonstrated specific 
changes in the insula of mindfulness practitioners during experimental tasks. For 
instance, Farb et al. (2007) found that MBSR participants were more likely than a waitlist 
group to activate the insula when focusing on moment-by-moment experience. Both the 
MBSR and waitlist group also demonstrated reduced activity in cortical midline regions 
of the brain (associated with self-referential thinking and the default network) when 
focusing on present-moment as compared to narrative, judgmental thought patterns.  
In another study, Farb et al. (2010) hypothesized that for people with mindfulness 
training, negative emotions may be perceived as ―fluctuations in body state sensations‖ 
rather than mental states reflecting what is good or bad. Using fMRI imaging, they found 
that MBSR participants demonstrated higher insula activity, lower self-referential 
processing, and lower emotional reactivity to sad film clips, in addition to fewer overall 
depressive symptoms, compared to waitlist controls. Also right insula activity and 
Wernicke‘s area were negatively correlated. The researchers theorized that there may be 
a trade-off between language-laden regulatory processes and interoceptive regulatory 
processes, with the former correlating highly with depression. 
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Farb et al. (2012) further found that MBSR participants demonstrated increased 
connectivity between regions of the insula, even during non-interoceptive attention tasks. 
Additionally, MBSR practice time was positively correlated with greater signal amplitude 
in regions of the insula. 
Lutz et al. (2008a) used fMRI imaging to examine the brain activity of 16 
experienced meditators (10,000 to 50,000 hours of meditation practice experience) and 
16 novice meditators (approximately 7 hours of meditation practice experience) during a 
meditation on feelings of ―lovingkindness‖ or compassion. During the lovingkindness 
meditation, participants were presented with 25 2-second audio clips that possessed 
positive, negative, or neutral valences. When emotional sounds were presented, the insula 
and cingulate cortices were more active in the meditation state than the resting state 
across participants. For presentation of negatively valenced sounds during the meditation, 
experienced meditators demonstrated more significant activation of the insula. Insula 
activity was also positively associated with self-reported intensity of the lovingkindness 
meditation across participants. The insula and empathy have also been linked in studies 
of adolescents with conduct disorder and high-functioning individuals with autism 
(Craig, 2009). In these studies, lower empathy levels were associated with reduced 
anterior insula cortex gray matter and activation levels (Craig, 2009).  
Grant, Courtemanche, and Rainville (2011) found that long-term meditators 
showed increased insula activity compared to non-meditators when experiencing pain. 
This was accompanied with a significant downshift in the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, 
and hippocampus, and less connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and the anterior 
cingulate cortex. These findings have been replicated to an extent by Gard et al. (2011), 
in which they found that mindfulness practitioners experienced less pain when receiving 
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shocks. This pattern was accompanied by increased insula activity and decreased 
prefrontal cortex activation. They also discovered reduced anticipatory anxiety leading up 
to the shocks in the mindfulness meditators. Although Grant et al. (2011) and Gard et 
al.‘s (2011) studies demonstrate meditators‘ insula activity in relationship to physical 
pain, they may also be relevant to meditators‘ experience of the interoceptive facet of 
emotional pain. Indeed, studies are now indicating that emotional pain and physical pain 
are experienced similarly in the brain (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & 
Williams, 2003). 
Some studies, however, have found no evidence of increased insula activity or 
volume in meditators and/or mindful people (Holzel et al., 2011a; Ives-Deliperi et al., 
2010; Luders et al., 2009). Ives-Deliperi et al. (2010) even found a significant decrease in 
insula activity during mindfulness meditation. Further, at least one study demonstrated 
higher ACC activity for mindfulness meditators compared to non-meditators (Holzel et 
al., 2007), while another study found higher ACC activity for non-meditators compared 
to meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). Are these studies anomalies or is there 
another possible explanation? 
Fletcher et al. (2010) warn that if we do not agree what mindfulness is, it is 
difficult to know what to look for in neuroimaging. For instance, is mindfulness what is 
measured by a questionnaire, how long someone has practiced mindfulness meditation, or 
something else altogether? The danger is to draw conclusions from neuroimaging that are 
predicated on poorly understood and defined constructs. Fletcher et al. propose rigorous 
observation of well-defined behaviors as a means of clarifying what we are studying 
when we examine neuroimaging studies.  
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While operational definitions of mindfulness may be partially to blame for 
contradictory results, it is also possible that the role of the insula, the ACC, and other 
regions of the brain in mindful interoception are not yet fully understood. A number of 
studies have also identified a strong relationship between insula activity, anterior 
cingulate cortex activity, and anxiety (Craig, 2002; Crichtley et al., 2004; Wiens, 2005). 
Right anterior insula activity is also implicated in recall-generated sadness, anger, 
anticipatory pain, panic, and disgust (Craig, 2002).  
In a 2004 study, Critchley et al. found that right anterior insula activity was 
predictive of anxiety (as measured by the Hamilton Anxiety Scale). Additionally, anxiety 
was significantly positively correlated with scores on a tone-based heartbeat detection 
task. Using fMRI and voxel-based morphometry, 17 subjects were scanned while 
performing an interoceptive task (tone-based heartbeat detection task) and an 
exteroceptive task (tone detection task). No differences were found between subjective 
difficulty or performance accuracy for the two tasks. Relative interoceptive activity 
correlated non-significantly with depressive symptoms and trait ratings of negative 
affective experience; however, for these results to have been non-significant while 
demonstrating strong correlations, it suggests that the study was under-powered. The 
right anterior insula was also the region most strongly correlated with accuracy on the 
interoception task. 
Paulus and Stein (2006) theorize that anxiety occurs when an interoceptive signal 
from the insula travels to the ACC, and the ACC then registers an exaggerated error 
signal for the difference between the observed body state and the expected body state. 
They postulate that ―anxiety sensitivity‖ is thus simply an individual‘s proneness to 
miscalculate the threat of an interoceptive signal. Paulus and Stein further argue that this 
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system of error signaling involving the insula and ACC is more central to the 
neuroanatomy of anxiety than the amygdala. In support of this hypothesis, they note that 
in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
simple phobias, symptom provocation is associated with increased blood flow to the 
insular cortex. They additionally point to increased insula activity in generalized anxiety 
disorder, social phobia, and panic disorder.  
The insula has also been implicated in the experience of ―craving‖ (Gray & 
Crichtley, 2007). Naqvi et al. (2007) found that lesions in the insula eliminated craving 
for people addicted to smoking. Similarly, Kilts et al. (2001) found that crack cocaine 
addicts showed increased insula activity during the experience of craving the drug. These 
results cloud the interpretation of increased insula size and activation in mindfulness 
practitioners, given that one consequence of mindfulness practice is the reduction of 
craving (Olendzki, 2010). 
Given that regions of the brain associated with interoception are also associated 
with anxiety and craving, it is likely premature to draw conclusions from neuroimaging 
studies demonstrating that mindfulness practice increases activity and structural thickness 
in these areas. 
The Mindful Interoception Sampling Task 
Developing a measure of mindful interoception. Clearly, there are many 
obstacles to measuring MI. Retrospective self-report questionnaires possess questionable 
validity and may be interpreted differently by different people. Ironically, the ability to 
carefully attend is necessary for accurate, retrospective reports of attention ability, which 
may result in invalid responses for many people. Further, self-presentation biases, 
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particularly for people who have received mindfulness training, could easily skew the 
results. Accordingly, MI makes a poor object of self-report.  
Neuroimaging and traditional interoceptive tasks struggle to differentiate anxious 
people and mindful people. Anxious people should be expected to be skilled at 
interoception in a time-limited, high-pressure situation, given that they evaluate internal 
cues as threatening and thus attention-worthy. However, models of anxiety described by 
theorists such as Borkovec, Foa, and Hayes, would also predict distraction or avoidance 
of internal cues if the opportunity were present. Specifically, these models of anxiety 
would predict that anxious people would avoid internal cues via distraction such as mind 
wandering given ample time, low novelty, and low cognitive demands (Schooler & 
Smallwood, 2006). 
Another obstacle to developing a measure of MI is control of interoceptive cues. 
Traditionally, attention tasks in psychology have measured the accuracy of attention by 
calculating number of items identified correctly/incorrectly, and/or by calculating speed 
of identification. However, endogenous interoceptive cues are not so easily controlled or 
measurable. One solution is to calculate the accuracy of identifying a measurable 
endogenous internal process, such as heartbeats. Yet even if heartbeat detection tasks 
were extended over longer periods of time, allowing for mind wandering, they still would 
not be measuring mindful interoception, given that they focus on one specific physical 
sensation to the exclusion of all other sensations. This form of rigid, hypervigilant 
attention is best representative of anxiety disorders such as panic disorder and 
hypochondriasis. Not surprisingly, panic disorder patients consistently obtain high scores 
on heartbeat detection tasks (Van der Does et al., 2000) 
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Lutz et al. (2008b) explored a related distinction in their review of neuroimaging 
studies on focused attention (FA) meditation and open monitoring (OM) attention. They 
describe FA meditation as ―voluntary focusing attention on a chosen object in a sustained 
fashion‖ and OM meditation as ―non-reactively monitoring the content of experience 
from moment to moment, primarily as a means to recognize the nature of emotional and 
cognitive patterns‖ (p. 164). Lutz et al. consistently use open monitoring meditation as a 
synonym for mindfulness meditation, but they note that they prefer the term ―open 
monitoring‖ because of the multiple definitions mindfulness has.  
Lutz et al. (2008b) theorize that OM meditation should improve monitoring, 
vigilance and disengaging attention from stimuli that distract attention from the ongoing 
stream of experience, and demonstrate stronger monitoring of bodily states. This reflects 
the idea that mindful awareness of emotional states as they are experienced in the body 
involves attention to whatever is being experienced rather than attention to a rigid, 
predefined sensation. To this end, Lutz et al. (2008b) note a study in which open 
monitoring meditators demonstrated better performance than focused attention meditators 
on Wilkins‘ counting test, a sustained attention task, in which the stimuli was unexpected 
(Valentine & Sweet, 1999, as cited by Lutz et al., 2008b).  
An MI measure would thus need to allow for any sensation within a broad 
parameter to be the focus of attention. Such a measure would acknowledge that 
interoception occurs across many different areas of the body, and that ability to sustain 
attention on one area does not necessarily predict ability to sustain attention on another 
area. It would additionally acknowledge that MI is not about quantifying sensations 
(which in itself can be a form of distraction), but rather experiencing the quality and 
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valence of the sensations in the present moment. As such, this precludes the use of 
narrowly defined targets of interoceptive attention, such as heartbeats. 
What is needed then, is a measure that A) assesses in vivo interoception, B) 
measures sustained attention, C) assesses attention throughout the body, D) allows for 
attention to a variety of qualitatively distinct sensations, and E) does not require 
quantification of the target stimulus. 
Point ―E‖ is particularly tricky, given the nature of most attention tasks. 
Fortunately, cognitive psychologists studying ―mind wandering‖ have already developed 
thought sampling methods for assessing sustained attention to a non-measurable stimulus.  
In probe-caught thought sampling tasks, participants are interrupted during a task 
and queried about off-task episodes (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In one such task, 
participants are asked to read a long text and are then interrupted periodically to 
determine if they are focused on the text or mind wandering. A slight variation is a self-
caught thought sampling task, in which participants track their own off-task episodes. 
Both types of measures generally require a yes/no response. In self-caught thought 
sampling, results are confounded by participants‘ ability/inability to remember to track 
mind wandering. Probe-caught thought sampling thus provides a more accurate sampling 
of mind wandering activity. 
Besides possessing methodological utility, mind wandering tasks also have direct 
relevance to the construct of MI. If mental distraction is the primary means by which 
people avoid the interoceptive element of emotion, then a probe-caught sampling task, 
assessing sustained attention to sensations within sequential, broadly defined areas of the 
body, could provide a measure of MI.  
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Another consideration in measuring MI is how to assess for non-evaluation or 
nonjudgment. Fortunately, sustained interoception is implicitly non-evaluative. Carmody 
(2009) notes that judgment only occurs when the mind is distracted from the present 
moment. As previously mentioned, mindfulness of body is considered the gateway to 
mindfulness in Buddhist psychology because pure sensory awareness precludes 
evaluative thoughts that create aversions and attachments (Olendzki, 2010). Present 
moment attention is therefore synonymous with non-evaluative attention. 
Supporting the premise that present-moment attention decreases mental suffering, 
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) have shown that mind wandering is negatively 
associated with happiness. In this study, the researchers developed an iPhone app that 
queried and recorded people‘s mental state at random times throughout the day. The 
prompts measured emotion (―How are you feeling right now?‖) and mind wandering 
(―Are you thinking about something other than what you are currently doing?‖). People 
were less happy when mind wandering than when not and this was true for all activities. 
People were no happier when thinking about pleasant thoughts than they were when 
attending to the present moment, and were significantly less happy when thinking about 
neutral or negative thoughts than when attending to the present moment. Time-lag 
analyses revealed that mind wandering typically caused negative moods, instead of being 
the effect. Smallwood et al. (2007) have also found that mind wandering as measured by 
a thought sampling task is associated with dysphoria.  
Killingsworth and Gilbert‘s (2010) study found that mind wandering occurred in 
46.9% of queries. In a text comprehension study (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), 13% of 
participants reported mind wandering during an attention task to a neutral stimulus. 
Given that it is likely more difficult to sustain attention to endogenous physical 
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sensations than to a novel and distinct reading task, a probe-caught sampling task that 
directs attention to internal cues should catch participants‘ minds wandering a significant 
percentage of the time. With multiple probes per testing, there should also be a good 
range of response scores. To allow for the possibility of mind wandering, the task would 
need to allow for significant periods of non-directed silence during which the 
participants‘ attention would have the opportunity to wander. The task would also need to 
assess various interoceptive foci of the body to attain a comprehensive measure of MI 
ability. 
It would additionally be necessary to demonstrate that an MI sampling task is 
specifically measuring sustained attention to internal sensations rather than sustained 
attention broadly defined. To address this concern, performance on an MI sampling task 
could be contrasted with a measure of mindful attention that is not specifically focused on 
interoceptive cues.  
The validity of a MI sampling task would also be dependent upon whether people 
can accurately report attention to physical sensations. Traditional mind wandering 
sampling tasks use text as a focus of attention; as such, people are able to track their own 
mind wandering based on whether or not they have made progress through the text. With 
a non-linear focus of attention such as physical sensations, there is no progress marker 
that allows people to easily assess whether their minds have wandered. Accordingly, 
some people may struggle to identify instances of mind wandering. It is also conceivable 
that people who experience high levels of mind wandering will underreport instances of 
mind wandering if they are not attuned to when it occurs. As such, it will be particularly 
important to assess whether a MI sampling task consistently correlates with 
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hypothetically related constructs. With sufficient convergent evidence, these potential 
critiques of a MI sampling task will be effectively addressed. 
The Mindful Interoception Sampling Task (MIST). As noted previously, five 
criteria need to be met in order to develop a valid measure of mindful interoception. The 
measure must A) assess in vivo interoception, B) measure sustained attention, C) assess 
attention throughout the body, D) allow for attention to a variety of qualitatively distinct 
sensations, and E) not require quantification of the target stimulus. Following several 
prototypes, the current Mindful Interoception Sampling Task or the ―MIST‖ was 
developed.  
The MIST is a probe-caught sampling task that measures attention to endogenous 
interoceptive cues in four distinct regions of the body: the abdomen, the chest, the 
muscles of the back, and the neck and throat. These regions of the body were selected 
based on the observation that frequently cited physical concomitants of emotional 
experience are often experienced in these areas. Research on the regions of the body 
where people physically experience emotions confirms that these regions of the body are 
frequently cited as central to emotional experience (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & 
Hietanen, 2014). On the MIST, participants listen to standardized audio directions at the 
onset, followed by one trial run, and four two minute periods of silence during which 
they are instructed to attend to interoceptive cues (see Appendix A for full text). Each 
period of silence lasts two minutes and possesses three random audio probes to assess 
mind wandering. If the participant‘s mind has wandered, he/she is instructed to click a 
counter. If the participant‘s mind has not wandered, he/she is instructed to continue 
attending to the body. At the conclusion of the recording, the participant‘s number of 
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clicks is recorded as his/her MIST total score. A high score on the MIST is thus reflective 
of fewer reported instances of MI.  
Although neuroimaging, detection tasks, and self-report measures all fall short of 
validly assessing MI, these measures are still useful for developing a nomological net 
assessing the construct validity of the MIST. Measures that most closely measure MI 
(e.g., scales of the MAIA) would be expected to demonstrate the strongest associations 
(an approximation of convergent validity), followed by measures that assess mindfulness 
of sensations more broadly (e.g., the awareness subscale of the Philadelphia Mindfulness 
Questionnaire), followed by general non-interoceptive mindfulness measures (e.g. the act 
with awareness subscale of the FFMQ) and neuroimaging of general interoceptive ability 
(e.g. fMRI insula activity). Traditional measures of interoception (e.g. the Schandry 
heartbeat detection task) and measures of anxiety sensitivity (e.g. the ASI-3) would 
further be expected to be uncorrelated or to demonstrate discriminant validity.  
For the purposes of this initial validation study, construct validity measures have 
been selected based on the population being studied and the resources available. To this 
end, neuroimaging was excluded as a measure based on feasibility. Compared to 
neuroimaging, some of the potential strengths of the MIST include its cost effectiveness, 
ease to administer, and short duration. However, the MIST protocol in conjunction with 
neuroimaging techniques could someday provide the first opportunity to determine in 
vivo relationships between MI and regions of the brain, such as the insula.  
The primary importance of the MIST, however, is to provide a means to 
accurately and efficiently measure MI as a mediating variable in clinical interventions. 
Understanding the relative importance of improved MI in interventions will provide 
scientist-practitioners a reason to choose MI-based interventions for specific clinical 
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Participants in this study were male and female students recruited from 
undergraduate psychology courses at the University of Louisville. College student 
samples were similarly used in the original validation studies of the self-report measures 
used to determine convergent and discriminant validity in this study. Participants in the 
current study were compensated with course credit in their psychology course, as 
determined by their instructor. The inclusion criteria for the study were as follows: A) 18 
years of age or older and B) English reading proficiency sufficient for following 
directions and responding to self-report measures. 
An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1.3 (Erdfelder, Faul, 
& Buchner, 1996) software to determine the required sample size for the study. Of the 
analyses being run, the only relationship that had been previously researched was that 
between anxiety sensitivity and heartbeat detection tasks. In their 2010 meta-analysis, 
Domschke et al. reported that the relationship between anxiety sensitivity and heartbeat 
detection tasks had a Cohen‘s d of 0.61 (N = 149).   
Given the unknown effect sizes of the relationships being examined in this study, 
a conservative approach was used to determine the a priori required sample size. Using a 




 size of 71 was required to detect a small to medium effect size (d =0.4). To be 
conservative, we aimed to recruit at least 100 participants and recruited 108 participants 
in total. 
Procedures 
Participants met with study personnel in the Biobehavioral Research Laboratory 
at the University of Louisville. Study personnel first offered the participant a seat, then 
reviewed informed consent, provided informed consent forms, and offered to answer 
questions.  
Once informed consent was obtained the following steps occurred. The 
participants filled out a brief demographic form with gender and date of birth to identify 
and exclude potential participants under the age of 18. The researcher then collected a 
resting blood pressure reading using an electronic sphygmomanometer.  
Using a random number generator to select the first task, the researcher then 
administered either the MIST (see Appendix C for detailed protocol) or the Schandry 
heartbeat detection task (see Appendix D for detailed protocol). If the Schandry heartbeat 
detection task was selected first, the researcher next attached a 3-lead EKG with the 
participant‘s permission (see Appendix B for detailed protocol). Once an EKG signal was 
obtained, the researcher collected a resting heart rate reading. The researcher then 
administered the Schandry heartbeat detection task and subsequently removed the 3-lead 
EKG.  
After the completion of both the MIST and the Schandry task, the participant was 
asked to complete the following battery of self-report measures: the ASI-3 (see Appendix 
E), the Act with Awareness subscale of the FFMQ (see Appendix F), the Awareness scale 
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of the PHLMS (see Appendix G), and the following MAIA subscales, a) Not-worrying, b) 
Attention Regulation, and c) Body Listening (see Appendix H). The order of 
administering the battery of self-report measures was also determined by random number 
generator. Finally, the participant was asked for any feedback on the study and thanked 
for his/her participation in the study. 
Measures 
Control variables and demographic data. Gender, blood pressure, and resting 
heart rate data were collected as potential covariates. Gender has been demonstrated to 
correlate with performance on the Schandry heartbeat detection task (Ehlers et al., 2000). 
Blood pressure (O‘Brien, Reid, & Jones, 1998) and resting heart rate (Knapp-Kline & 
Kline, 2005) have been demonstrated to correlate with performance on other heartbeat 
detection tasks.  
Self-report measures. 
Anxiety sensitivity index-3 (Appendix E). The ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007) is an 
18-item self-report questionnaire assessing three domains of anxiety sensitivity 
determined by factor analysis: physical concerns, cognitive concerns, and social 
concerns. Taylor et al. define anxiety sensitivity as ―fear of arousal-related sensations‖ (p. 
177) and observe that anxiety sensitivity is a ―diathesis for various types of anxiety 
disorders, including panic disorder, social anxiety disorder, specific phobia, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder‖ (p. 177). Sample items from the ASI-3 include ―It scares 
me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task‖ and ―It scares me when my heart beats 
rapidly.‖ The ASI-3 was validated on a sample of young adults across Canada and the 
United States and demonstrates good construct validity and reliability. 
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Act with awareness subscale of the five-facet mindfulness questionnaire 
(Appendix F). The FFMQ (Baer, et al., 2006) is a five-factor scale developed from a 
factor analysis of five earlier mindfulness scales. The Act with Awareness subscale is an 
8-item scale that measures mindful attention without explicitly assessing MI. 
Accordingly, the Act with Awareness subscale should demonstrate weaker convergent 
validity with the MIST than a more explicit measure of MI. Sample items from the Act 
with Awareness subscale include ―I am easily distracted‖ and ―I find it difficult to stay 
focused on what‘s happening in the present.‖ The FFMQ was originally validated on 
undergraduate students and possesses good internal consistency and construct validity. 
Awareness subscale of the Philadelphia mindfulness questionnaire (Appendix 
G). The PHLMS is a self-report questionnaire with two orthogonal 10-item subscales, 
―acceptance‖ and ―awareness‖ (Cardaciotto, et al., 2008). Unlike most other mindfulness 
self-report scales, the Awareness subscale of PHLMS has prompts that assess 
interoception.  
Representative prompts on the PHLMS awareness subscale include ―When I am 
startled, I notice what is going on inside my body,‖ ―When talking with other people, I 
am aware of the emotions I am experiencing,‖ and ―I am aware of what thoughts are 
passing through my mind.‖ The PHLMS was originally validated on a non-clinical 
college student sample, and the awareness scale demonstrates good internal consistency 
and convergent and discriminant validity. 
The Attention Regulation, Body Listening, and Not-Worrying Scales of the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (Appendix H). The MAIA is 
a self-report measure assessing eight scales of interoceptive awareness (Mehling et al., 
2012). Of these scales, the 7-item Attention Regulation scale, the 3-item Body Listening 
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scale, and the 3-item Not-Worrying scale were selected as the most face valid scales for 
assessing MI. These scales were additionally the most face valid scales for measuring MI 
of any self-report measures of body awareness reviewed. Representative prompts include 
―I can maintain awareness of my inner bodily sensations even when there is a lot going 
on around me,‖ ―I listen for information from my body about my emotional state,‖ and ―I 
can notice an unpleasant body sensation without worrying about it.‖ These scales 
demonstrated good internal consistency and convergent and discriminant validity. 
Behavioral measures of interoception. 
The Mindful Interoception Sampling Task (MIST). The MIST is a probe-caught 
sampling task that measures attention to endogenous interoceptive cues in four distinct 
regions of the body.  
The Schandry heartbeat detection task. The Schandry heartbeat detection task 
(Schandry, 1981) is one of the most commonly used measures of interoception. 
Participants are asked to count their heartbeats over three periods of time: 25 seconds, 35 
seconds, and 45 seconds. Using an EKG, participants‘ heartbeat estimates are then 
assessed for accuracy by calculating the difference between reported and actual 
heartbeats and dividing that value by actual heartbeats. The researcher then takes the 
absolute value of each detection period error score and adds these three values together. 
Accordingly, a higher score on the Schandry heartbeat detection task indicates less 









The following chapter reviews the findings of the study, including those of 
primary, supplementary, and exploratory analyses. Primary analyses directly assessed a 
priori hypotheses of the study. Supplementary analyses assessed new questions that arose 
as a consequence of findings in the primary analyses. Exploratory analyses examined 
questions related to future directions in the development and validation of the MIST, and 
broader questions about assessment of MI.  
Corrections for multiple comparisons were not applied as attempting to reduce 
Type I errors for null results would have increased the likelihood of Type II errors 
(Rothman, 1990). This risk of making Type II errors is particularly important to consider 
for this current study given how little is known about the newly proposed construct of MI 
or the MIST itself. Still, all results, and particularly the post-hoc secondary and 
exploratory analysis results, should be interpreted with the caveat that the number of 
correlations conducted increases the likelihood of Type I errors. Accordingly, results are 
to be interpreted as probabilities rather than as absolutes, and more importantly, as guides 





A total of 108 individuals participated in this study. Overall there were 89 female 
and 19 male participants. Fifteen data points total were excluded due to procedural errors 
(e.g. incomplete questionnaires, equipment problems). Data points three standard 
deviations above or below the mean were additionally removed to normalize the data. 
Using this standard, only four variables had outliers removed. Below is the total N for 
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The data were then analyzed to ensure that assumptions of parametric statistics 
were met. No variables violated the assumption of homoscedasticity. Only the ASI-3 
Physical Concerns subscale, the ASI-3 Cognitive Concerns subscale, and the ASI-3 Total 
score violated the assumption of normality. Square root transformations were used to 
create normal distributions for these variables. Subsequent analyses using ASI-3 Physical 
Concerns, ASI-3 Cognitive Concerns, and ASI-3 Total were conducted using square-root 
transformed data. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Ordering Effects. An independent samples t-test was run to determine whether 
the order in which the MIST and the Schandry Task were presented influenced scores on 
these respective tasks. There was no significant difference on MIST scores between 
participants who completed the MIST first (M = 6.04, SD = 2.43) and participants who 
completed the Schandry Task first (M = 6.05, SD = 2.71); t(106) = -.03, p = .98. 
Additionally, there was no significant difference on Schandry Task scores between 
participants who completed the MIST first (M = 1.10, SD = 0.47) and participants who 
completed the Schandry Task first (M = 1.03, SD = 0.65); t(98.1) = .64, p = .53. 
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Participants were administered one of four versions of the MIST, each with a 
different ordering of the four focal regions of the body. A repeated measures ANOVA 
determined that MIST focal region scores were not statistically significantly different 
based on their sequence within the script (F(3, 321) = 1.45, p = .23 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
MIST Focal Regions, by Sequence in Script 
Region M  SD 
 
























Internal Consistency. Participants focused on four sequential regions of the body 
in each administration of the MIST. A repeated measures ANOVA determined that MIST 
region scores were not statistically different based on specific region of the body (F(3, 
321) = 1.156, p = .33) (Table 5). Mauchly‘s test of sphericity revealed the assumption of 











MIST Focal Regions, by Region of Body 



























Identifying Potential Covariates. As described earlier, gender, systolic blood 
pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and resting heart rate were identified as potential 
covariates for analyses involving interoceptive tasks. The following analyses were 
conducted to assess potential collinearity between the Schandry Task, the MIST, and the 
aforementioned variables. 
An independent samples t-test found no significant difference on MIST scores 
between male participants (M = 5.79, SD = 2.07) and female participants (M = 6.10, SD = 
2.67); t(106)= -.48, p = .63. A second independent samples t-test found no significant 
difference on Schandry Task scores between male participants (M = 1.08, SD = 0.75) and 
female participants (M = 1.06, SD = 0.53); t(20.69) = .085, p = .93.  
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the interoceptive tasks and physiological measurements. 
Significant correlations were found between the MIST and systolic blood pressure (r = -
.28, p < .01) and between the Schandry Task and resting heart rate (r = .28, p = .01). 
Specifically, higher systolic blood pressure was significantly correlated with low scores 
on the MIST (i.e. fewer instances of mind wandering). Additionally, higher resting heart 
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rate was significantly correlated with high scores on the Schandry task (i.e. worse 




Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for Interoceptive Tasks and Potential 
Physiological Covariates 








r = -.28** 
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r = -.08 
p = .43 
 
r = .04 
p = .68 
 
r = .28** 
p = .01 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
Based on the observed collinearity, semi-partial correlations were conducted with 
the MIST and Schandry Task, controlling for systolic blood pressure and resting heart 
rate, respectively. These analyses were conducted in addition to Pearson product-moment 
correlations. Visual comparisons of semi-partial correlations and Pearson product-
moment correlations were used to assess the relative influences of the covariates on the 
results. The results of the semi-partial correlational analyses can be found in the 





Hypothesis 1. The MIST was hypothesized to be either positively correlated or 
uncorrelated with all 3 subscales (physical, cognitive, and social concerns) of the Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3). 
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the MIST and the ASI-3 subscales. Semi-partial correlations, were 
also conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the MIST 
controlling for the effects of systolic blood pressure. No significant correlations were 
found in either analysis, confirming the hypotheses. Tables 7 and 8 summarize these 
results. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The Schandry heartbeat detection task was hypothesized to be 
negatively correlated with all 3 subscales (physical, cognitive, and social concerns) of the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3). 
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the Schandry Task and the ASI-3 subscales and total score. Semi-
partial correlations, were also conducted to determine the amount of covariance 
accounted for by the Schandry Task controlling for the effects of resting heart rate. No 
significant correlations were found in either analysis. The original hypothesis was not 









Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for Interoceptive Tasks and ASI-3 Subscales 
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r = .07 
p = .50 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
 Hypothesis 3. The MIST was hypothesized to be negatively correlated with the 
act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to determine the 
relationship between the MIST and the act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ. The 
results indicated there was a significant negative correlation between the two variables, r 
= -.30, p < .01, confirming the hypothesis. A semi-partial correlation was also conducted 
to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the MIST controlling for the 
effects of systolic blood pressure. The results indicated there was still a significant 
negative correlation between the MIST and the act with awareness subscale of the 
FFMQ, r = -.27, p < .01. 
 Hypothesis 4. The Schandry heartbeat detection task was hypothesized to be 
positively correlated or uncorrelated with the act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ. 
 A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to determine the 
relationship between the Schandry Task and the act with awareness subscale of the 
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FFMQ. The results indicated there was not a significant correlation between the two 
variables, r = .07, p = .47, confirming the hypothesis. A semi-partial correlation was also 
conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the Schandry Task 
controlling for the effects of resting heart rate. The results indicated there was still not a 
significant correlation between the Schandry Task and act with awareness subscale of the 
FFMQ, r = .08, p = .44. 
Hypothesis 5. The MIST was hypothesized to be negatively correlated with the 
following scales of the MAIA: not-worrying, attention regulation, and body listening. 
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the MIST and the not-worrying, attention regulation, and body 
listening scales of the MAIA. The results indicated there was a highly significant 
negative correlation between the MIST and the MAIA attention regulation scale (r = -.44, 
p < .01). Significant correlations with the other two MAIA scales were not found 
although the relationship with MAIA body listening approached significance (r = -.17, p 
= .07). Semi-partial correlations were also conducted to determine the amount of 
covariance accounted for by the MIST controlling for the effects of systolic blood 
pressure. The results again confirmed there was a highly significant negative correlation 
between the MIST and the MAIA attention regulation scale (r = -.41, p < .01) while no 
significant correlations with the other two MAIA scales were found. Tables 9 and 10 
summarize these results. 
 
Hypothesis 6. The Schandry heartbeat detection task was hypothesized to be 
positively correlated or uncorrelated with the following scales of the MAIA: not-
worrying, attention regulation, and body listening. 
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 Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the Schandry Task and the not-worrying, attention regulation, and 
body listening scales of the MAIA. The results indicated there was a significant negative 
correlation between the Schandry Task and the MAIA body listening scale (r = -.21, p = 
.04), disconfirming the hypothesis. The other two MAIA scales had non-significant 
correlations, confirming the original hypothesis. Semi-partial correlations were also 
conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the Schandry Task 
controlling for the effects of resting heart rate. The results indicated there was again a 
significant negative correlation between the Schandry Task and the MAIA body listening 
scale (r = -.21, p = .04) while the other two MAIA scales still had non-significant 
correlations. Tables 9 and 10 summarize these results. 
Table 9 











r = .07 
p = .46 
 
 
r = -.44**  
p < .01 
 
r = -.17 
p = .07 
Schandry Task r = .05 
p = .61 
 
r = -.09 
p = .39 
r = -.21* 
p = .04 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
Hypothesis 7. The MIST was hypothesized to be negatively correlated with the 
awareness subscale of the PHLMS. 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to determine the 
relationship between the MIST and the awareness subscale of the PHLMS. The results 
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suggested there was not a significant correlation between the two variables, r = -.10, p = 
.29, indicating the hypothesis was not confirmed. A semi-partial correlation was also 
conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the MIST controlling 
for the effects of systolic blood pressure. The results suggested there was still not a 
significant correlation between the MIST and the awareness scale of the PHLMS, r = -
.09, p = .36. 
 Hypothesis 8. The Schandry heartbeat detection task was hypothesized to be 
positively correlated or uncorrelated with the awareness subscale of the Philadelphia 
Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS). 
A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to determine the 
relationship between the Schandry Task and the awareness subscale of the PHLMS. The 
results suggested there was not a significant correlation between the two variables, r = 
.00, p = .99, indicating the hypothesis was confirmed. A semi-partial correlation was also 
conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted for by the Schandry Task 
controlling for the effects of resting heart rate. The results suggested there was still not a 
significant correlation between the Schandry Task and the awareness scale of the 
PHLMS, r = -.03, p = .75. 
 Hypothesis 9. The MIST was hypothesized to be uncorrelated with the Schandry 
heartbeat detection task. 
 A Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted to determine the 
relationship between the MIST and the Schandry Task. The results suggested there was 
not a significant correlation between the two variables, r = -.03, p = .78, indicating the 
hypothesis was confirmed. Semi-partial correlations were also conducted to determine 
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the amount of covariance accounted for by the MIST and Schandry Task controlling for 
the effects of systolic blood pressure and resting heart rate, respectively. When 
controlling for the covariance between the MIST and systolic blood pressure, there was 
not a significant correlation between the MIST and Schandry Task, r = -.01, p = .90. 
When controlling for the covariance between the Schandry Task and resting heart rate, 
there was still not a significant correlation between the MIST and the Schandry Task, r = 
-.05, p = .64. 
 
 Hypothesis 10. The awareness subscale of PHLMS was hypothesized to be 
positively correlated with the following scales of the MAIA: not-worrying, attention 
regulation, and body listening. 
 Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the awareness subscale of the PHLMS and the not-worrying, 
attention regulation, and body listening scales of the MAIA. The results indicated there 
was a highly significant correlation in the hypothesized direction between the PHLMS 
awareness subscale and the MAIA attention regulation scale (r = .40, p < .01). There was 
also a significant correlation in the hypothesized direction between the PHLMS 
awareness subscale and the MAIA body listening scale (r = .19, p = .05). There was not a 
significant correlation between the PHLMS awareness subscale and the MAIA not-
worrying scale, disconfirming that hypothesis. Table 11 summarizes these results. 
 
Hypothesis 11. The act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ was hypothesized 
to be positively correlated with the following scales of the MAIA: not-worrying, attention 
regulation, and body listening. 
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Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted to determine the 
relationships between the act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ and the not-
worrying, attention regulation, and body listening scales of the MAIA. The results 
indicated there was a highly significant correlation in the hypothesized direction between 
the act with awareness subscale of the FFMQ and the MAIA attention regulation scale (r 
= .33, p < .01). There was not a significant correlation between the FFMQ awareness 
subscale and the MAIA not-worrying or body listening scales, disconfirming those 
hypotheses. Table 11 summarizes these results. 
 
Table 11 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for PHLMS Awareness Scale and FFMQ Act with 










r = .16 
p = .10 
 
r = .40** 
p < .01 
 
r = .19* 
p = .05 
 
FFMQ Act with 
Awareness 
 
r = .07 
p = .46 
 
r = .33**  
p < .01  
 
r = .10 
p = .33 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
Hypothesis 12. To confirm construct validity, a specific pattern of relationships 
between the MIST and other tested variables was hypothesized in the form of a 





Hypothesized Nomological Net 
Order Measures 
 
Most significant negative correlation 
 
MAIA Scales (not-worrying, attention 
regulation, & body listening) 
 
Less significant negative correlation 
 
PHLMS awareness scale 
 
Least significant negative correlation  
 






Uncorrelated or positive correlation 
 
ASI-3 total and subscales (physical 
concerns, cognitive concerns, social 
concerns) 
   
 Table 13 depicts the actual pattern of relationships between the MIST and the 






Observed Pattern of Pearson Product-Moment Correlations 
Measure Correlation (r) 
 




































ASI-3 physical concerns 
 
.08 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
  
Supplementary Analyses 
To better understand the observed pattern of relationships between the MIST and 
the variables of the hypothesized nomological net, supplementary analyses were 
conducted to determine the relationship between component focal regions of the MIST 
and the variables of interest.  
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine if there were differences 
between male and female participants for the focal regions of the MIST. No significant 









































































equal variances not assumed. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below 
means. 
 
 Pearson product-moment correlations were then conducted to determine the 
relationships between the MIST focal regions and physiological measurements. Table 15 





Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for MIST Focal Regions and Potential 
Physiological Covariates 









r = -.17 
p = .08 
 
r = -.06 
            p =.54 
 
r = -.02 




r = -.17 
p = .08 
 
r = -.10 
p = .29 
 
r = .00 




    r = -.30** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.18 
p = .07 
 
r = .03 




r = -.12 
p = .24 
 
r = .01 
p = .96 
 
r = .09 
p = .38 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
 Based on the observed collinearity between the back region and systolic blood 
pressure, semi-partial correlations were conducted with the back region, controlling for 
systolic blood pressure. These analyses were conducted in addition to Pearson product-
moment correlations. Visual comparisons of semi-partial correlations and Pearson 
product-moment correlations were then used to assess the relative influences of systolic 
blood pressure on the results.  
Table 16 depicts the pattern of relationships between the MIST focal regions and 
variables of interest, with a column of MIST-total correlations for comparison. Semi-
partial correlations were also conducted to determine the amount of covariance accounted 
for by the back region controlling for the effects of systolic blood pressure. Table 17 





















r = -.44** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.32** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.32** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.25** 
p = .01 
 
r = -.27** 
p = .01 
 
FFMQ act with 
awareness 
 
r = -.30** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.22* 
p = .03 
 
r = -.26** 
p = .01 
 
r = -.05 
p = .63 
 
r = -.29** 





r = -.17 
p = .07 
 
r = -.05 
p = .61 
 
r = -.23* 
p = .02 
 
r = -.12 
p = .20 
 
r = -.07 





r = -.12 
p = .20 
 
r = -.17 
p = .09 
 
r = .00 
p > .99 
 
r = -.07 
p = .47 
 
r = -.10 




r = -.10 
p = .29 
 
r = -.16 
p = .10 
 
r = -.15 
p = .12 
 
r = .07 
p = .46 
 
r = -.04 





r = -.09 
p = .34 
 
r = -.07 
p = .51 
 
r = -.08 
p = .40 
 
r = -.07 
p = .50 
 
r = -.04 




r = -.04 
p = .66 
 
r = -.07 
p = .46 
 
r = -.02 
p = .82 
 
r = -.05 
p = .64 
 
r = .03 




r = -.03 
p = .78 
 
r =-.13 
p = .20 
 
r = .03 
p = .78 
 
r = .08 
p = .40 
 
r = -.06 




r = .07 
p = .46 
 
r = .10 
p = .31 
 
r = .09 
p = .38 
 
r = .02 
p = .86 
 
r = -.01 





r = .08 
p = .41 
 
r = .08 
p = .42 
 
r = -.02 
p = .87 
 
r = .04 
p = .68 
 
r = .12 
p = .24 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
  
Exploratory Analyses 
Based on the relationships between variables of the nomological net and the 
MIST focal regions, it appears the abdomen and chest region most closely approximate 
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the nomological net with the neck/throat region being a somewhat poorer fit and the back 
region a considerably poorer fit. Accordingly, two new variables were created to assess 
potential variations of the MIST. MIST-ACN was created by adding the scores from the 
abdomen, chest, and neck/throat regions. MIST-AC was created by adding the scores 
from the abdomen and chest regions. Results of these analyses should be interpreted with 
the caveat that scores obtained on each region may have been indirectly influenced by the 
presence of other focal regions that were present in the administration of the measure but 
excluded in the calculation of these new variables. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to determine if there were significant 
differences between male and female participants on the new versions of the MIST. No 






Independent Samples T-tests Examining Differences in MIST-ACN & MIST-AC Mean 





































Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. 
 
Pearson product-moment correlations were then conducted to determine the 
relationships between the new versions of the MIST and physiological measurements. 
Table 19 summarizes these results.  
 
Table 19 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for MIST-ACN, MIST-AC, and Potential 
Physiological Covariates 








r = -.21* 
p = .03 
 
r = -.07 
p = .45 
 
r = .03 




r = -.21* 
p = .03 
 
r = -.10 
p = .31 
 
r = -.01 
p = .92 




Based on the observed collinearity between the new versions of the MIST and 
systolic blood pressure, semi-partial correlations were conducted with these versions of 
the MIST, controlling for systolic blood pressure. These analyses were conducted in 
addition to Pearson product-moment correlations. Visual comparisons of semi-partial 
correlations and Pearson product-moment correlations were then used to assess the 
relative influences of systolic blood pressure on the results.  
Table 20 depicts the pattern of relationships between the new versions of the 
MIST and other variables of interest, with a column of MIST-total correlations for 
comparison. Semi-partial correlations were also conducted to determine the amount of 
covariance accounted for by the new versions of the MIST controlling for the effects of 






Pearson Product-Moment Correlations for New Versions of MIST, MIST-total, and 
Hypothetically-Related Variables 





r = -.44** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.40** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.43** 
p < .01 
 
FFMQ act with  
awareness 
 
r = -.30** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.29** 
p < .01 
 
r = -.35** 
p < .01 
 
MAIA body  
listening 
 
r = -.17 
p = .07 
 
r = -.17 
p = .08 
 
r = -.16 
p = .10 
 
ASI-3 social  
concerns 
 
r = -.12 
p = .20 
 
r = -.10 
p = .31 
 
r = -.12 





r = -.10 
p = .29 
 
r = -.19* 
p = .05 
 
r = -.16 
p = .10 
 
ASI-3 cognitive  
concerns 
 
r = -.09 
p = .34 
 
r = -.09 
p = .36 
 
r = -.09 




r = -.04 
p = .66 
 
r = -.06 
p = .56 
 
r = -.03 




r = -.03 
p = .78 
 
r = -.06 
p = .54 
 
r = -.07 
p = .47 
 
MAIA not  
worrying 
 
r = .07 
p = .46 
 
r = .11 
p = .25 
 
r = .08 
p = .40 
 
ASI-3 physical  
concerns 
 
r = .08 
p = .41 
 
r = .04 
p =.70 
 
r = .08 
p = .40 
Note. * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01. 
 
 
The hypothesized nomological net proposed that the measures theoretically most 
closely related to MI would have the strongest relationship with the MIST. For 
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exploratory purposes, the degree to which these other measures related to the 
hypothesized nomological net was also explored. Table 22 demonstrates the correlations 
between measures and the hypothesized nomological net. The order of correlations has 
been reversed from the original nomological net given that high MIST scores reflect 











The present study aimed to develop a measure of MI, the MIST, hypothesizing 
that the variant of interoception described in Buddhist writings and taught in present-day 
mindfulness practice is qualitatively different from the variant of interoception assessed 
by traditional measures of interoception. In order to establish construct validity of the 
measure, the MIST was hypothesized to have a specific pattern of relationships with 
conceptually related variables. Furthermore, the MIST was hypothesized to match this 
pattern of relationships more closely than the Schandry heartbeat detection task, a 
traditional measure of interoception. Results of the study suggest the MIST is a 
promising, valid, behavioral measure of mindfulness; however, there remain some 
lingering questions as to whether the MIST specifically assesses MI. The MIST does, 
however, clearly demonstrate stronger construct validity with MI than the Schandry Task, 
which may help explain the null results obtained by other studies examining the 
relationship between mindfulness practice and interoception as assessed by more 
traditional measures (Khalsa et al., 2008; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2006; Parkin et al., 2013).  
This chapter will discuss the findings of this initial validation study, discuss 
strengths and weaknesses of the study, and propose future research that could build on
these results and further contribute to the understanding of the effects of MI in clinical 
practice. 
Ordering Effects and Internal Consistency 
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Participants in the study were administered both the MIST and Schandry Task, 
with the ordering of the two tasks randomly selected. Analyses indicated that the order in 
which the measures were administered did not influence participants‘ scores. These 
results suggest that participants neither benefited from practice effects nor were hindered 
by attentional fatigue across tasks.   
Each participant was also randomly administered one of four variations of the 
MIST, each with a different sequence of the four MIST focal regions. No significant 
differences were observed between regions based on their sequence in the script. The 
absence of practice effects within the test suggests that the MIST measures a construct 
with stability within each individual assessment period.  
The MIST was also analyzed for differences between specific focal regions of the 
body, independent of their sequence within the task. No significant differences were 
found between these focal regions. This suggests good internal consistency between the 
components of the MIST. Further, it implies the MIST is measuring a global construct 
that is not based on specific regions of the body.  
Potential Covariates 
Previous studies on the measurement of interoception identified gender, blood 
pressure, and heart rate as potential covariates (Ehlers et al., 2000; Knapp-Kline & Kline, 
2005; O‘Brien, Reid, & Jones, 1998). In the present study, analyses revealed systolic 
blood pressure and resting heart rate to be significantly collinear with the MIST and 
Schandry Task, respectively.  
More accurate heartbeat detection on the Schandry Task was associated with 
slower resting heart rate, which is consistent with previous findings (Knapp-Kline & 
Kline, 2005). A slower heart rate likely provides more opportunity to detect each 
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individual heartbeat, thereby increasing accuracy. A slower heart rate is also associated 
with greater volume of blood flow with each beat, which could potentially increase 
sensory information and heart rate detectability.  
Lower levels of reported mind wandering on the MIST were significantly 
associated with higher systolic blood pressure. Although this relationship was not 
specifically hypothesized, one explanation is that increased blood pressure with each 
contraction of the heart creates a more salient sensation, facilitating the maintenance of 
attention to the body.  
The high collinearity of systolic blood pressure with the MIST and of resting 
heart rate with the Schandry Task raises the possibility that systolic blood pressure and 
resting heart rate were responsible for significant shared variance between these 
interoceptive tasks and other variables of interest. Accordingly, additional analyses were 
conducted controlling for these covariates for the respective interoceptive tasks. 
However, controlling for these covariates revealed negligible differences between the 
magnitudes of correlations across analyses (see Supplemental Tables). 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 
Previous studies found that anxiety sensitivity was significantly correlated with 
increased accuracy on the Schandry Task (Eley, Stirling, Ehlers, Gregory, & Clark, 2004; 
Steward-Buffett-Jerrott, & Kokaram, 2001; Sturges & Goetch, 1996). These results, 
however, were not replicated in the current study. This finding is incongruent with the 
proposed explanation that the lack of an association between the Schandry Task and 
mindfulness practice in other studies was partially a consequence of the Schandry Task‘s 
high collinearity with anxiety sensitivity. However, specific characteristics of the current 
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sample may have clouded the true relationship between the Schandry Task and anxiety 
sensitivity.  
Participants‘ scores in the current study on the social concerns subscale of the 
ASI-3 were over a standard deviation above the North American sample mean obtained 
in the validation study for the ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007). Their social concerns mean 
score was more consistent with the generalized anxiety and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder samples‘ means obtained in the validation study. 
Representative prompts on the social concerns subscale include: ―It is important 
for me not to appear nervous,‖ ―I worry that other people will notice my anxiety,‖ and ―It 
scares me when I blush in front of people.‖ These characteristics of the sample may have 
clouded the relationship between the Schandry Task and other anxiety sensitivity scales, 
as anxious participants‘ attention was directed externally to the investigator rather than to 
more internal processes such as anxiety about physical symptoms or anxiety about 
thought processes. These more internal variants of anxiety sensitivity would be expected 
to have a closer relationship to anxious interoception and the Schandry Task by 
extension. For instance, prompts from the somatic concerns and cognitive concerns ASI-
3 scales include ―It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task‖ and ―It 
scares me when my heart beats rapidly.‖ These more internally directed anxiety 
sensitivities may have been more dominant in other study samples, accounting for the 
greater collinearity between the Schandry Task and the ASI-3 in previous research. 
The MIST also did not demonstrate a significant relationship with the ASI-3, in 
this case confirming the hypothesis that there would either be a positive correlation or no 
correlation at all. However, given the unusual elevation in social anxiety sensitivity in the 
sample, it is worth considering whether the MIST primed concerns about social 
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judgment. This potential for self-report inaccuracies and presentation biases is a 
limitation of the MIST that is not present in the Schandry Task, which has a more 
objective standard with which to measure attention.    
Self-Report Measures of Mindfulness and MI 
The self-report measures of mindfulness and MI examined in this study were the 
FFMQ act with awareness scale, the PHLMS awareness scale, and the not-worrying, 
body listening, and attention regulation scales of the MAIA. Each scale was hypothesized 
to have a significant negative correlation with the MIST, and to be uncorrelated or to 
have a significant positive correlation with the Schandry Task. As hypothesized, none of 
these scales were significantly correlated with the Schandry Task, with the exception of 
the body listening scale of the MAIA. The MAIA attention regulation scale and the 
FFMQ act with awareness scale were significantly negatively correlated with the MIST. 
The relationship between the MIST and the MAIA body listening scale almost reached 
significance, while the correlation with the PHLMS awareness scale was clearly non-
significant and the correlation with the MAIA not-worrying scale was non-significant in 
the opposite direction of the hypothesis. 
The pattern of relationships between the mindfulness variables and interoceptive 
tasks provides useful qualitative information about the variants of interoception being 
measured. The Schandry Task, as hypothesized, did not have a relationship with self-
report measures of MI, besides MAIA body listening, offering evidence that it is not a 
measure of MI. This would further explain why the Schandry Task has demonstrated no 
association with mindfulness practice in other studies. As hypothesized, the Schandry 
Task also was uncorrelated with the MIST, suggesting they measure distinct constructs. 
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While the MIST did demonstrate a clear relationship with multiple measures of 
mindfulness, it did not demonstrate a significant relationship with the PHLMS awareness 
scale. This is a potential concern, given that the PHLMS awareness scale was 
hypothesized to have a particularly strong relationship with the MIST. Only the MAIA 
scales were hypothesized to have a stronger relationship with the MIST.  
One potential explanation for the PHLMS awareness scale‘s non-significant 
relationship with the MIST is that the PHLMS awareness scale was measuring something 
other than MI. The PHLMS was initially hypothesized to have a strong relationship with 
the MIST by virtue of being a validated mindfulness scale with several prompts directly 
assessing awareness of the body. However, a closer examination of the prompts reveals 
that none directly assess non-evaluative attention to the body. For instance, ―When I am 
startled, I notice what is going on inside my body‖ or ―I notice changes inside my body, 
like my heart beating faster or my muscles getting tense‖ might both be endorsed by a 
person high in MI and a person high in hypochondriasis. Still, although the PHLMS 
awareness scale may not directly assess MI, it does have significant relationships with the 
other mindfulness measures in this study, suggesting some degree of construct validity.   
Another possibility is that the MIST measures something other than MI. Indeed, 
the MIST has strong relationships with purer attentional scales, like the attention 
regulation scale of the MAIA and the FFMQ act with awareness scales, while having 
poorer relationships with the PHLMS awareness scale and MAIA body listening scale. 
The possibility that the MIST is just a measure of attention is somewhat unlikely, 
however, given that the relationships the MIST has with self-report mindfulness measures 
(PHLMS excluded) are of similar magnitude to the relationships those measures have 
with one another, suggesting the MIST is assessing a similar construct. 
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Construct Validity of MIST Focal Regions  
There is another possible explanation for the MIST‘s weaker relationship with the 
PHLMS awareness scale. It may be that particular focal regions of the MIST are poor 
indicators of MI. To examine this possibility, individual focal regions of the MIST were 
assessed for their fit with the proposed nomological net. 
A review of these patterns of relationships reveals the MIST back region has 
particularly weak relationships with every variable of interest with the exception of the 
MAIA attention regulation scale. The MIST back region was also the only variable to 
have a significant relationship with a physiological covariate, systolic blood pressure. 
The MIST neck/throat region demonstrated strong significant relationships with 
the MAIA attention regulation scale and the FFMQ act with awareness scale, while 
having no relationship with PHLMS awareness scale or MAIA body listening scale. This 
suggests that the MIST neck/throat region may significantly influence the MIST‘s weaker 
relationships with the latter measures. 
The MIST abdomen region also has strong significant relationships with the 
MAIA attention regulation scale and the FFMQ act with awareness scale, with a stronger 
but still non-significant relationship with the PHLMS awareness scale. The abdomen 
region has no relationship with the MAIA body listening scale. 
The MIST chest region has strong significant relationships with the MAIA 
attention regulation scale, the FFMQ act with awareness scale, and the MAIA body 
listening scale. It also has a stronger but still non-significant relationship with the 
PHLMS awareness scale than the MIST. 
Examining these focal regions independently, it is apparent that the back region, 
in particular, and the neck/throat region to a lesser extent are contributing to the 
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unexpected patterns of relationships between the MIST and variables of the nomological 
net. It is possible that individuals high in MI struggle to attend to these regions; however, 
a more likely explanation is that individuals who are low in MI are performing better on 
these two focal regions than would be expected.  
The back region and the neck/throat region, to a lesser degree, are regions in 
which muscular tension is a dominant sensation. It may be that people with high muscle 
tension have an advantage in attending to a region in which muscle tension is a 
particularly salient sensation. As MI is taught as a means of reducing stress, including 
physiological stress, it may be that people high in MI are at a slight initial disadvantage 
due to the reduced saliency of their muscular tension. This initial disadvantage might then 
negate the advantage of greater MI abilities. 
Further correlational analyses examining the focal regions of the MIST reveal that 
the back region is highly significantly correlated with systolic blood pressure, with the 
abdomen and chest regions possessing significant but considerably weaker relationships 
with systolic blood pressure, and the neck/throat region possessing an insignificant 
association.  
The range of associations between MIST focal regions and systolic blood pressure 
is further evidence that participants focus on different types of sensations within each 
region. The limited sensory innervation of the back and the limited sensations of 
breathing associated with the back may make blood pressure and muscle tension the most 
accessible focal points. Systolic blood pressure could be experienced as an actual 
pressure or as the felt reverberation of heart contractions. The felt sensations of 
heartbeats, blood pressure, and muscle tension in the back region could also be made 
more salient by participants sitting with their back pressed against the chair.  
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In contrast, the abdomen and chest regions do not press against an exterior surface 
during the administration of the MIST. They also have greater sensory innervation and 
include more immediate breathing sensations. Still, these regions were significantly 
correlated with systolic blood pressure, suggesting that for some participants the felt 
intensity of each heart contraction or blood pressure may have influenced participants‘ 
ability to remain focused. The neck/throat region may have been less correlated with 
systolic blood pressure as a result of the availability of more accessible sensations of 
breathing in the throat. 
In effect, the MIST does not control for differences in intensity of physical 
sensations. A dramatic example of this limitation would be an individual with severe 
chronic back pain. Although that individual may feel the urge to distract him/herself from 
the sensations in the back, he/she would have the ―advantage‖ of a highly salient 
sensation that demands attention. In a less extreme example, an individual with a mild 
sunburn would also have less difficulty directing attention to such a sensation that 
demands his/her attention. 
One possible solution is to instruct individuals to focus on the breath to the 
exclusion of other sensations. As participants can control the sensory intensity and rate of 
individual breaths, there is not the inherent advantage or disadvantage there is with 
focusing on heartbeats or muscle tension (unless breathing is painful for the individual). 
However, the exclusion of body sensations other than the breath limits the degree to 
which the construct being measured is similar to mindful observation of bodily sensations 
as they occur in day-to-day living. There is also the risk that narrowly focused attention 
on the breath could result in a measurement more akin to a heartbeat detection task; 
however, this risk might be mitigated some by instructing the individual to attend to any 
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sensations associated with the breath. Another consideration is the removal of the back 
region from the MIST, given the high collinearity between this region and systolic blood 
pressure, its lack of sensations apart from muscle tension, and its poor fit with the 
nomological net. The back region is also the only focal region for which the effects of 
gender approached significance. Future studies may have more equal gender 
representation and thus more power to detect effects of gender, in which case the possible 
effects of gender on the back region may be a concern.  
Variations on the MIST 
To confirm the observation that removing variables might improve the construct 
validity of the MIST, new variables were created, the MIST-ACN and the MIST-AC. The 
MIST-ACN consists of scores from the abdomen, chest, and neck/throat regions of the 
MIST while the MIST-AC consists of scores from the abdomen and chest regions of the 
MIST.  
Both composite measures demonstrated greater fidelity to the nomological net 
than the total MIST. The MIST-ACN has very strong relationships with the MAIA 
attention regulation and FFMQ act with awareness scale and strong but non-significant 
relationships with the MAIA body listening and PHLMS awareness scales. The MIST-
AC also has very strong relationships with the MAIA attention regulation and FFMQ act 
with awareness scale, and a significant relationship with the PHLMS awareness scale and 
a strong but non-significant relationship with the MAIA body listening scale.  
As mentioned earlier in the results section, it should be noted that each region‘s 
scores may have been influenced by the presence of other focal regions that were present 
in the administration of the measure but excluded in the calculation of the MIST-AC and 
MIST-ACN. Still, these exploratory analyses strongly suggest that the MIST might be a 
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more valid measure of MI if the back region and possibly the neck/throat region were 
excluded. In addition to increased validity, these shortened forms of the MIST could 
increase usability. 
Observations on the MAIA 
Although no pure measure of MI existed when this study was proposed, the 
authors of a yet-to-be published multidimensional paper-and-pencil measure of MI, the 
MAIA, provided permission for its use in this study. The MAIA has since been published 
(Mehling et al., 2012), making the current study one of the first to utilize the measure and 
independently assess the validity of MAIA scales. 
Three scales from the MAIA were selected for use in this study: the attention 
regulation scale, the body listening scale, and the not-worrying scale. The former two 
scales were selected based on their strong conceptual similarities to MI while the latter 
scale was selected based on the theory that MI ability would be greatest for individuals 
who can sustain attention to physical experiences without avoiding the experience via 
worry. Representative prompts from these scales include: ―I can refocus my attention 
from thinking to sensing my body‖ (attention regulation scale); ―When I am upset, I take 
time to explore how my body feels‖ (body listening scale); and ―I can notice an 
unpleasant body sensation without worrying about it‖ (not-worrying scale).  
Contrary to my hypotheses, the MAIA not-worrying scale was uncorrelated with 
the MIST or any other measure of mindfulness or MI in the current study. The MAIA 
not-worrying scale did, however, have a strong relationship with ASI-3 physical and 
cognitive concerns, suggesting high ―not-worrying‖ about physical symptoms is 




In the Mehling et al. (2012) validation study for the MAIA, the not-worrying 
scale had a strongly significant relationship with the attention regulation scale and a 
slightly stronger relationship with the body listening scale than it does in the current 
study. That the relationship with the attention regulation scale in the current study is not 
only non-significant but is opposite the hypothesized direction was certainly not expected 
but consistent with the overall lack of relationship observed between MI and 
worry/anxiety-related scales. Another potential explanation for these findings is the 
presence of measurement error in any replication of previous studies (Stanley & Spence, 
2014).  
The MAIA body listening scale demonstrated a significant relationship with the 
MAIA attention regulation and PHLMS awareness scale but not with the FFMQ act with 
awareness or MAIA not-worrying scales. This might be indicative of the more cognitive 
bent of the latter two measures. However, the body listening scale also had a surprising 
significant relationship with the Schandry Task while having an almost significant 
relationship with the MIST and a non-significant relationship with each focal region of 
the MIST except the chest region.  
The body listening scale, like the PHLMS awareness scale, does not specifically 
assess the non-evaluative component of MI. The three prompts for the scale are: ―I listen 
for information from my body about my emotional state,‖ ―When I am upset, I take time 
to explore how my body feels,‖ and ―I listen to my body to inform me about what to do.‖ 
By not clearly distinguishing between types of interoception, the MAIA body listening 
scale may actually be measuring interoception more broadly, accounting for its similarly 
strong relationships with both the MIST and the Schandry Task. 
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The MAIA attention regulation scale demonstrated very strong significant 
relationships with the MIST, the MAIA body listening scale, the PHLMS awareness 
scale, and the FFMQ act with awareness scale. The MAIA attention regulation scale also 
demonstrated an ordering of relationships with these scales that suggests a valid measure 
of MI: in order, the MIST, the PHLMS awareness scale, the FFMQ act with awareness 
scale, and close behind, the MAIA body listening scale. The strength and ordering of 
these relationships reveal that the MAIA attention regulation scale is a particularly strong 
and valid measure of MI from a construct validity perspective, aside from any theoretical 
limitations of paper-and-pencil measures.  
Limitations 
Although this study aimed to recruit a diversity of participants, the actual sample 
was unusual in several ways. There were 89 female participants to only 19 male 
participants, bringing into question the applicability of the results to a male population. 
Moreover, the participants were recruited exclusively from undergraduate psychology 
courses. As such, there was limited diversity of education, age, and academic interest. 
Examining the data, participants also reported levels of social anxiety sensitivity 
consistent with clinically anxious populations. This may have resulted in impression 
management and lack of awareness of internal processes across measures. All results 
should be interpreted in light of this possibility. 
A limitation in validating the MIST is the inherent difficulty of assessing how 
accurately individuals are reporting. The convergent validity the MIST demonstrates with 
other measures of mindfulness and MI does however suggest the MIST is not more prone 
to presentation biases than other scales. That there is less interpretation involved in the 
MIST than retrospective paper-and-pencil questionnaires may even increase veracity of 
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responses. Still, the MIST could be more prone to presentation biases than most other 
measures given the social pressure inadvertently created by collecting individual‘s self-
report on a performance task. Although data collection was designed to reduce social 
pressure by collecting responses through clickers via a computer that was not facing the 
participants, it is possible social pressures still played a role in participants‘ responding.  
There are some concerns, too, about the ecological validity of the MIST. Being 
instructed in a research setting to sustain attention to endogenous sensations may be a 
qualitatively different experience than attending to emotionally-charged sensations as 
they occur in everyday life. The assumption of the study is that both experiences draw 
upon similar skills; however, the possibility that these skillsets are quite different should 
be considered when drawing conclusions about MI and its potential role as a clinical 
mechanism of change. 
Lastly, the dearth of validated scales available with which to validate the MIST 
limited the conclusions drawn from the results. For instance, the PHLMS awareness scale 
and MAIA body listening scale both superficially appeared to be mindfulness scales that 
assessed interoception; however, the lack of questions specifically assessing non-
evaluative attention in both scales may have clouded any results or lack thereof. Further 
research using a broad range of measurements will be needed to overcome this current 
limitation. 
Strengths 
In clinical research, there are many studies in which the results can be predicted 
with a high level of certainty before the study is ever conducted. In contrast, the present 
study asked a genuinely novel question for which there was a high probability the 
hypotheses could be disproven. Numerous research groups previously attempted to 
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determine the relationship between mindfulness and interoception, with virtually no 
success. The current study, in turn, was the first to propose the existence of variants of 
interoception, and of MI specifically. Given the novelty of the construct being proposed, 
the MIST, a behavioral measure of MI, was then validated using an entirely different 
modality of measures, paper-and-pencil questionnaires. Using this standard, there was 
little to no guarantee that measuring mind wandering while a person attends to 
endogenous sensations in the body would A) demonstrate MI construct validity, and B) 
demonstrate better MI construct validity than a traditional interoceptive task.  
That significant correlations in the hypothesized directions were observed for a 
study charting such novel terrain is both an encouraging and substantial achievement. It 
should be emphasized that the very existence of a behavioral measure of mindfulness 
with strong relationships to previously validated mindfulness measures is in itself a novel 
and exciting discovery. Scores of mindfulness researchers and practitioners have 
lamented the use of retrospective, self-report measures to assess mindfulness. Focusing 
on temporally distant and vaguely defined experiences and evaluating those experiences 
as mindful or not is difficult for participants, of questionable accuracy, and is antithetical 
to mindfulness practice and theory. The MIST, in contrast, is the first behavioral, present-
moment measure of mindfulness that has been developed. Although it does rely on a self-
reported evaluation of mind wandering, it uses a value-free, present-moment, yes/no 
question to determine whether attention is focused or distracted.  
This behavioral measure of mindfulness may or may not, however, specifically 
measure MI. The pattern of observed relationships between the MIST and variables of the 
nomological net did not clearly distinguish between mindfulness broadly defined and MI. 
This ambiguity could be reflective of the validity of the questionnaires used for validation 
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or the MIST itself. Another possibility is that MI is so central to mindfulness that the two 
constructs are essentially indistinguishable. Given these various possibilities, further 
research, as outlined in the following section, is still needed to distinguish between 
measurement of mindfulness broadly defined and MI specifically. Still, whatever the case 
may be, the MIST has potential for wide use as the first validated behavioral measure of 
mindfulness. 
Future Directions 
This initial validation study of the MIST suggests numerous possibilities for 
future research on the MIST and MI more generally. First, the current results could be 
replicated, using the same battery of measures as this study. However, this subsequent 
study could also include an extended battery of measures that would further corroborate 
the validity of the MIST. This could include an additional anxiety measure and a 
depression scale to determine if general anxiety and mood have relationships with the 
MIST. Neuroimaging could ascertain whether hypothesized regions of the brain (e.g. 
insula, ACC) are active during reported MI on the MIST, potentially providing further 
support for the validity of the measure. Traditional mind wandering sampling tasks could 
also be included to further ascertain whether the MIST is measuring the construct of MI 
or sustained attention more broadly.  
The Schandry Task would no longer be included in this study, as the results of the 
current study clearly demonstrate that the Schandry Task does not measure MI. This 
future study could also include a more intentionally diverse sample on factors such as 
age, ethnicity, gender, education, and SES. A sample of experienced mindfulness 
practitioners could also be collected to determine expected differences between persons 
experienced with MI and those who are not. 
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Another possibility to consider is running a parallel study to the one described 
above in which abbreviated versions of the MIST were also tested and validated. These 
abbreviated versions of the MIST would considerably reduce administration time and 
might increase the validity of the measure, as evidenced by the exploratory analyses 
described above. 
Following these initial studies, a study could determine the reliability of the MIST 
and the effects of repeat administrations by testing participants every three weeks for 
three or four testing periods. With no mindfulness practice between administrations, 
participants‘ scores would be hypothesized to remain effectively the same over time. 
A subsequent study could then test the MIST as a mediating variable for an MI-
based mindfulness intervention. Participants could be tested on the MIST before 
treatment, at regular intervals during treatment, and after treatment. Using outcome 
variables such as anxiety measures, depression measures, mindfulness measures, quality 
of life measures, and physiological measures (e.g. heart rate, skin conductance, heart rate 
variability, blood pressure) the MIST would be assessed as a potential mediating variable 
for clinical improvements. Measurements such as the Schandry Task, MAIA attention 
regulation scale, and MAIA body listening scale could be assessed at the same intervals 
and also analyzed for mediation effects. The results would indicate which variables best 
account for the effects of MI training and could provide evidence for MI as an active 
mechanism of clinical change. Changes in the MIST and the other interoception-based 
measurements over time could also be correlated with frequency and length of time 




Finally, the MIST could be used broadly as a measure in intervention studies in 
which MI or mindfulness is a potential active mechanism. For instance, a study on the 
effects of MBCT on depression might examine the MIST as a mediating variable on 
depression outcomes and might also examine the relationship between practice time on 
the body scan and changes on the MIST. 
Closing Thoughts  
Based on the results of this current study, the MIST already holds the distinction 
as the first and only behavioral measure of mindfulness, a long-awaited development in 
mindfulness research. By continuing the process of validating the MIST, it is possible 
that its relationship to MI specifically will become clearer and that the measure itself can 
and will be used across a multitude of settings to ascertain the clinical effects of MI. The 
MIST promises to help answer the question to what extent practicing open, non-
judgmental sustained attention to our somatic experiences promotes mental and physical 
health. With greater understanding of this phenomenon and the contexts in which it is 
most effective, mental health practitioners stand to refine and improve the efficacy of the 
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Mindful Interoception Sampling Task (MIST) script. In a moment, you will 
begin a guided attention task. If you choose, you can close your eyes to better focus on 
the task, or if you prefer, you can leave your eyes open.  
During this task, you will be asked to direct your attention to inner sensations 
within different regions of your body. As you attend to these regions of the body you may 
notice any number of inner sensations. Some people notice sensations such as tightness, 
looseness, coolness, warmth, or tingling. It does not matter which sensation you attend to, 
or whether it‘s a strong sensation or a weak sensation. Just focus on the sensations in 
your body as they are. (Brief pause….) 
Now...in addition to inner physical sensations, your attention may also be drawn 
from time to time to thoughts or other mental events that come and go…we call this 
‗mind wandering‘, and it‘s a very common experience. Examples of mind wandering 
include internal conversations, daydreaming, or becoming distracted by a smell or sound.  
During the task you may find that instances of mind wandering draw your 
attention away from the physical sensations you are experiencing in the present moment. 
Whenever this occurs, we ask that you refocus your attention on the internal sensations 
present in your body in that moment.
 
Throughout the task, you will periodically hear a signal that sounds like 
this:______. At that moment, we ask that you determine if your attention is focused on 
inner physical sensations or on something else, like thoughts. If your attention has 
wandered from physical sensations, please press the clicker in your hand. If your 
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attention is presently on inner sensations, please continue focusing on the sensations and 
do not press the clicker. Other than pressing the clicker, you will not need to move your 
body during the task. 
During this task, you may have thoughts about the sensations in your body (for 
example, ‗I wonder if my stomach feels queasy because of the food I ate for breakfast‖). 
Although these thoughts are related to the body, they have still shifted the attention away 
from sensations that are occurring in that moment. If you notice that you are having 
thoughts about inner sensations rather than focusing on the sensations themselves, 
consider this ‗mind wandering‘. It is important that you understand this distinction so that 
you are able to make the most accurate reports possible.  
Before we practice, please let the facilitator know if you have any questions about 
this distinction or more generally about the task. (pause) 
Okay, let‘s practice…now bringing your attention to the inside of the nose….just 
being aware of whatever inner sensations you are experiencing. (2 minutes of silence 
with 3 signals) 
Please press the clicker to indicate that you are awake. Thank you. 
The facilitator will now clear the count on your clicker in preparation for the full 
task. During this interval, please let your facilitator know if you have any further 
questions. (pause) Remember it is very important that you report instances of mind 
wandering as truthfully as possible. Thank you for your participation – let‘s begin.  
(pause) 
Now bringing your attention to the abdomen, the center of the body….just being 




Please press the clicker to indicate that you are awake. Thank you. 
Now, bringing your attention to the chest region of the body… just being aware of 
whatever inner sensations you are experiencing (2 minutes of silence with 3 signals) 
Please press the clicker to indicate that you are awake. Thank you. 
Now, bringing your attention to the muscles in your back… just being aware of 
whatever inner sensations you are experiencing (2 minutes of silence with 3 signals) 
Please press the clicker to indicate that you are awake. Thank you. 
Now, bringing your attention to the neck and throat… just being aware of 
whatever inner sensations you are experiencing (2 minutes of silence with 3 signals) 
Please press the clicker to indicate that you are awake. Thank you. 
This marks the end of this guided attention task. Please take your time redirecting 
your attention outwardly. 
 
Appendix B  
 EKG protocol. Begin by rubbing a sterile, disposable sponge dipped in rubbing 
alcohol on the participant‘s wrist. The participant will be asked to sit still with his/her 
wrists facing up and the researcher will then attach two pre-gelled electrodes to the 
participant‘s left wrist and one pre-gelled electrode to the participant‘s right wrist. Using 
the Thought Technology Biograph Infiniti system, the researcher will attach the 
electrodes to the Thought Technology EKG equipment. The participant will be positioned 
to where he/she cannot see the EKG data on the computer screen.  
The researcher will next test the EKG connection to determine if the electrodes 
have a good connection. If the signal is weak or not working, the participant will be 
instructed to adjust his/her arms until a signal appears. If a signal still does not appear and 
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the participant is the same gender as the researcher, the researcher will offer to help assist 
with a torso placement, placing two electrodes under the clavicles and one electrode 
above the navel. If the participant is not the same gender as the researcher, the participant 
will be asked if he/she is willing to place the electrodes on his/her torso while the 
researcher leaves the room for privacy reasons. In this instance, the participant will be 
shown a diagram demonstrating the placement of the electrodes. If the participant 
declines at this time, this will end his/her involvement in the study and he/she will still 
receive course credit. Once an EKG signal is obtained either using the wrist or torso, the 
researcher will collect a baseline heart rate sample. 
 
Appendix C  
MIST protocol. Participants are seated and provided a clicker for counting 
instances of mind wandering. The researcher explains that the task involves listening to 
an audio recording and following directions. The researcher also explains that he/she will 
be seated out of view of the participant, but will be within hearing distance and available 
to answer questions. A visual barrier is placed between the researcher and the participant 
in order not to cause performance anxiety or expectations introduced by close 
observation.  
The researcher begins the MIST audio recording. The audio recording provides 
opportunities for the participant ask questions and interact with the researcher, in a 
limited manner. For the full text of the audio recording, see Appendix A. If the 
participant does not respond to any one of the prompts querying whether the participant is 
awake, the participant is assumed to have fallen asleep and his/her data is excluded from 
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the study. At the end of the audio recording, the researcher collects the clicker from the 
participant and then records the number of clicks as the participant‘s total MIST score. 
 
Appendix D.  
Schandry heartbeat detection task protocol. The administration of the 
Schandry heartbeat detection task is based on the sequence described in the original 
Schandry heartbeat detection task paper (Schandry, 1981). Participants are instructed to 
count their heartbeats over a set amount of time as accurately as possible, after which 
they report that number to the researcher. The researcher indicates that a heartbeat 
detection period has begun by saying ―Go‖; the heartbeat detection period is finished 
when the researcher says ―Stop.‖ Participants are positioned to where they cannot see the 
EKG readout on the computer screen. 
 Once the participant indicates that he/she understands the directions, he/she is 
given 60 seconds of rest before the first detection period. The first detection period lasts 
25 seconds. The ensuing rest period lasts 30 seconds. The second detection period lasts 
35 seconds. The ensuing rest period lasts 30 seconds. The third detection period lasts 45 
seconds. The final rest period lasts 60 seconds before transitioning to the MIST or to the 
self-report measures. 
During each detection period, the researcher records actual heartbeats via the 
EKG. After the participant has completed the study and left the laboratory, the researcher 
counts the number of actual heartbeats for each detection period. He/she then records an 
error score for each detection period by calculating the difference between reported and 
actual heartbeats and dividing that value by actual heartbeats. The researcher then takes 
the absolute value of each detection period error score and adds these three values 
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together. This sum score is then recorded as the participant‘s Schandry heartbeat 
detection task total score. A higher score thus correlates with a less accurate performance 




Anxiety sensitivity index-3 (ASI-3). Please circle the number that best 
corresponds to how much you agree with each item. If any items concern something that 
you have never experienced (e.g., fainting in public) answer on the basis of how you 
think you might feel if you had such an experience. Otherwise, answer all items on the 
basis of your own experience. Be careful to circle only one number for each item and 
please answer all items. 
 
0 = Very Little    1 = A Little    2 = Some   3 = Much   4 = Very Much 
 
1. It is important for me not to appear nervous.  
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly.  
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be seriously ill. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
6. When I tremble in the presence of others, I fear what people might think of me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that I won‘t be able to breathe properly. 




8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that I am going to have a heart attack. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
9. I worry that other people will notice my anxiety.  
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
10. When I feel ―spacey‖ or spaced out I worry that I may be mentally ill. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
11. It scares me when I blush in front of people.  
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something seriously 
wrong with  
   me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
13. When I begin to sweat in a social situation, I fear people will think negatively of me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that I might be going crazy. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I could choke to death. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
16. When I have trouble thinking clearly, I worry that there is something wrong with me. 
 0 1 2 3. 4 
 
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint in public.  
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is something terribly wrong with me. 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 
Scoring:  
Physical Concerns subscale prompts: 3, 4, 7, 8, 12, 15 
Cognitive Concerns subscale prompts: 2, 5, 10, 14, 16, 18 
Social Concerns subscale prompts: 1, 6, 9, 11, 13, 17 






Act with awareness subscale of the five-factor mindfulness questionnaire 
(FFMQ). Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Write the 
number in the blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for 
you. 
 
1 = never or very rarely true         2 = rarely true             3 = sometimes true   
              4 = often true              5 = very often or always true 
 
1)  When I do things, my mind wanders off and I‘m easily distracted. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
2)  I don‘t pay attention to what I‘m doing because I‘m daydreaming, worrying, or 
otherwise distracted. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   3) I am easily distracted. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   4) I find it difficult to stay focused on what‘s happening in the present. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   5) It seems I am ―running on automatic‖ without much awareness of what I‘m doing. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   6) I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   7) I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I‘m doing. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
   8) I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Scoring: Reverse score all items and sum together. 
 
Appendix G  
Awareness scale of the Philadelphia mindfulness scale (PHLMS). Please 
indicate how often you experienced each of the following statements within the past 
week.  
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Never  rarely  sometimes often  very often 
 




____ 3. When talking with other people, I am aware of their facial and body expressions. 
 
____ 5. When I shower, I am aware of how the water is running over my body. 
 
____ 7. When I am startled, I notice what is going on inside my body. 
 
____ 9. When I walk outside, I am aware of smells or how the air feels against. 
 
____ 11. When someone asks how I am feeling, I can identify my emotions easily. 
 
____ 13. I am aware of thoughts I‘m having when my mood changes. 
 
____ 15. I notice changes inside my body, like my heart beating faster or my muscles 
getting tense.  
 
____ 17. Whenever my emotions change, I am conscious of them immediately.  
 
____ 19. When talking with other people, I am aware of the emotions I am experiencing.  
 
Scoring: 
The Awareness scale total score is the sum of the odd numbered prompts. 
 
Appendix H  
 
The Not-Worrying, Attention Regulation, and Body Listening Scales of the 
Multidimensional Assessment of Interoceptive Awareness (MAIA). Below you will 
find a list of statements. Please indicate how often each statement applies to you 
generally in daily life. 
 
Circle one number on each line 
 
8. When I feel physical pain, I become upset. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
9. I start to worry that something is wrong if I feel any discomfort.  
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
10. I can notice an unpleasant body sensation without worrying about it. 
Never            Always 




11. I can pay attention to my breath without being distracted by things happening around 
me. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
12. I can maintain awareness of my inner bodily sensations even when there is a lot going 
on around me. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
13. When I am in conversation with someone, I can pay attention to my posture. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
14. I can return awareness to my body if I am distracted.  
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
15. I can refocus my attention from thinking to sensing my body.  
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
16. I can maintain awareness of my whole body even when a part of me is in pain or 
discomfort. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
17. I am able to consciously focus on my body as a whole. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
27. I listen for information from my body about my emotional state. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
28. When I am upset, I take time to explore how my body feels.  
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
29. I listen to my body to inform me about what to do. 
Never            Always 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
 
Scoring: 
Take the average of the items on each scale. 
 
Not-Worrying: Tendency not to worry or experience emotional distress with sensations 
of pain or discomfort 
 124 
 
Q8(reverse)______ + Q9(reverse)______ + Q10______ / 3 = ___________ 
 
Attention regulation: Ability to sustain and control attention to body sensations 
Q11_____ + Q12_____ + Q13_____ + Q14_____ + Q15_____ + Q16_____ + Q17_____ 
/ 7 = ___________ 
 
Body Listening: Active listening to the body for insight Q27_____ + Q28_____ + 
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